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United States, Petitioner, 
71- 1026 v. 
Mike Gravel, United States 
Senator. 
On Writs of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First 
Circuit. 
[June -, 1972] 
MR. J uSTICE WHI'l'E delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
These cases arise out of the investigation by a federal 
grand jury into possible criminal conduct with respect 
to the release and publication of a classified Defense 
Department study entitled "History of the United States 
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." This 
document, popularly known as the "Pentagon Papers," 
bore a Defense security classification of Top Secret-
Sensitive. The crimes being investigated included the 
retent.ion of J)Ublic property or records with intent to 
convert (18 U. S. C. § 641) the gathering and trans-
mitting of national defense information ( 18 U. S. C. 
§ 793), the concealment or removal of public records 
or documents (18 U. S. C. § 2071), and conspiracy to 
commit such offenses and to defraud the United States 
(18 U. S. C. § 371). 
Among the witnesses subpoenaed wore Leonard S. 
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and a resident fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies, 
and Howard Webber, Director of M. I. T. Press. Sen-
ator Gravel, as intervenor/ filed motions to quash the 
subpoenas and to require the Government to specify 
the particular questions to be addressed to Rodberg. ~ 
He asserted that naming these \vitnesses to appear and 
testify would violate his privilege under the Speech or 
Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, 
§ 6, Cl. 1. 
It appeared that on the night of June 29, 1971, Sen-
ator Gravel , as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Build-
ings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works Commit-
tee, convened a meeting of the Subcommittee and there 
read extensively from a copy of the Pentagon Papers. 
1 The District Court prrmitted Senator Gr:wd to intcrn'ne in 
the procrcding on Dr. Rodberg's motion to qunsh the subpoena 
ordering his appcnrnnre before the grand jury and accepted motions 
from Gran'! to qunsh the snbpo<'na and to specify the cx:1et nature 
of tlic questions to be asked Rodbrrg. The Go,-ernment contested 
Grn\'C'l':,; ~ tanding to appeal thr trial court's di~position of these 
motions on thr ground that , had thr subpoena been direct ed to the 
Senator, he could not haYe appcalrd from :1 drni:tl of a motion to 
qunsh without fir;-:t rrfu,;ing to romp!~· with the subpoenn and bring 
held in contrmp1. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971); 
f'obbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 32~ (1940). The Court of 
Apprnls, United States v. Doe, 45.5 F. 2d 758, 756-757 (CAl 1972), 
held thn t bern use 1 hr subporm wn~ dircrtrd to third parties, who 
could not br rountrd on to risk contempt to protect intcn·cnor's 
rights, Crawl might be "powerbs to a\·rrt the mischief of the 
ordrr" if not prrmitted to appml, citing Perlman v. United States, 
247 U. S. 7, 18 (1918). The United States doc~ not here ch:111rngc 
the propriety of thr :tppenl. 
2 Dr. Rodberg, who filed his own motion to quash the ~uhpocna 
directed hi~ appmrnnrc and tcstimon~·, apprnrrd ns amicus curiae 
both in the Court of Appeab :md thi~ Comt. Tcrlmirnlly, Rodbcrg 
stntrs, he is a Jlnrty to 71-102fl , in~ofar as the Go\'C'l'nmcnt nppcals 
from the protertiYc order entered by the District Court. Uowc,·cr, 
since Gravel inter,·cncd, Roclbcrg docs not press the point. Brief 
of Leonard 8. Rodbcrg ns Amicus Curiae 2, n. 2. 
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He then placed the entire 47 volumes of the study in 
the public record. Rodberg had been added to the 
Senator's staff earlier in the day a.nd assisted Gravel 
in preparing for and conducting the hearing. 'l Some 
weeks later there ''"ere press reports that Gravel had 
arranged for the papers to be published by Beacon 
Press ·• and that members of Gravel's staff had talked 
with Webber as editor of M. I. T. Press." 
The District Court overruled the motions to quash 
and to specify questions but entered an order proscrib-
ing certain categories of questions. United Slates v. 
Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (Mass. 1971). The Govern-
ment's contention that for purposes of applying the 
Speech or Debate Clause the courts were free to inquire 
into the regularity of the subcommittee meeting was 
rej ected.6 Because the clause protected all legislative 
3 The Di~1 rirt Court found " thnt , 'ns per~onnl ns~i~tnnt to mO\·nnt 
fGrtn-dl, Dr. Rodbc r~ ns~i~ted in preparin~ for di~rlo~nre nne! snb-
srqucntl:; di~rlo~i11g 1 o monmt's rollrng:nrs and ron~t it ut rnts, nt a 
hrn ring of tho Srnatr Subrommittrr on Publir Buildings nnd Grounds, 
the rontents of thr ~o-rnllrd "Prntng:on Pnprrs," whirh wf' rr rriticnl 
of thr F.xf'rnt in•\ conduct in thr field of forrign rrb tions.'" United 
States \" . Doe, :132 F . Supp. 9:30. 9:12 C:\'Tn~s. 1971). 
1 Braron Prrss is n diYi~ion of thr Unit.Hinn UniYer~nlist Assoc in-
tion, whirh apprnrcd llf'rr ns amicuB ruriae in ~npport of thr position 
t11ken b~· Scnntor Grnnl. 
~ Gr:wd so allr~c·d in his mot ion to intcn·rnc in tho Webbrr 
mattrr and to qua~h thr ~ubporna ordrring: " 'rhbrr to nppe11r nnd 
irstify. App. 15-lR. 
0 Thr Go\·rrnnwnt maintninrcl thnt Congrrs,; dor~ not rnjoy un-
limitrd ]10\rrr to ronduct bu~inr~s nnd thnt judicial revi rw ha ;;; oftrn 
b rcn rwrri:;ccl to c·urb extra-lrgi~lntive incur~ion ~ by legi~la1i\"C' com-
mittcrs, citing TV atkins v. United States, 35-+ U. S. 178 (1957) ; 
llfrGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. K 135 (1927) ; Ilentoff v. ! chord, 
318 F. Supp. 1175 tCADC 1970), at least whrrr ~urh inrur~ions am 
unrcbtecl to a lrgit imatc lcgi~ lat i\·r purpo~c. It was allrgrd that 
Gravel had "rom·rnrd a sprrial, unauthorizrcl nnd untimrly meeting-
of the Senate Subrommittrc on Public Works (at midnight on 
Juno 29, 1971), for th e purpose of reading the dorumrnts and there-
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acts, it was held to shield from inquiry anything the 
Senator did at the subcommittee meeting and "certain 
acts done in preparation therefor." /d .. at 935. The 
Senator's privilege also prohibited "inquiry into things 
done by Rodberg as the Senator's aide or assistant which 
would have been legislative acts, and therefore priv-
ilt>ged, if performed by the Senator personally." /d., 
at 937-938. 7 The trial court, however, held the private 
republication of the documents was not privileged by 
the Speech or Debate Clause.8 
nftrr placed all unrrad portions in the subcommittee rrrord, with 
Dr. Rodberg soliciting publication aftrr thr meeting." App. 9. The 
Dist rirt Court rrjrctrd the contrntion: "Srna tor Grn vrl has sug-
p;rstrd that the availability of funds for thr construction and im-
provrment of publir buildings and grounds has been affertrd by the 
nerrssary costs of the war in Virtnam and that therrfore the de-
velopment and conduct of the war is properly within the concrrn 
of the subcommittre. Thr court rrjrrts the Governmrnt's argu-
ment. without detnilrd considrration of the merits of the Senator's 
position, on the bnsis of thr general rule restricting inquiry into 
matters of legis !at i1·r purpo,;e and operations." United States v. 
Doe, 332 F. Supp. 980. 985 (Mnss. 1971). Cases such as Watkins, 
supra, were distinguished on the ground that they concrrned the 
power of Congress undrr the Constitution: "It has not been sug-
grsted by the govrrnment that the subcommittee itself is unauthor-
ized, nor that thr wnr in Vietnam is an issue beyond the purview of 
congressional debate and :tction. Also, the individual rights at 
stake in these proceedings arc not those of a witness before a con-
grrssional committee or of a subject of a committee's investigation, 
but only those of a congressman and member of his personal staff 
who claim 'intimidation by the exrcutivc.'" !d., at 736. 
7 The District Court thought that Rodbcrg could be qucstionrd 
concerning his own conduct prior to joining the Senator's staff and 
comPrning the acti1·itie~ of third parties with whom Rodbcrg and 
Gravel dealt. United Statrs v. Dol', 332 F. Supp. 930, 934 (:i\fass. 
1971). 
8 The protective order entered by the Di trict Court pro1·ided as 
follows: 
"(1) No witness before the gr:tncl jury cnrr<:'ntly im·estigating the-
release of the Pentagon Papers mny be questioned about Senator 
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the mo-
tions to quash but modified the protective order to. 
reflect its own views of the scope of the congressional 
privilege. United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753 (CAl 
1972). Agreeing that Senator and aide were one for 
the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause and that 
the clause foreclosed inquiry of both Senator and aide 
with respect to legislative acts, the Court of Appeals 
also viewed the privilege as barring direct inquiry of 
the Senator or his aide, but not of third parties, as to· 
the sources of the Senator's information used in per-
forming legislative duties.n Although it did not con-
sider private republication by the Senator or Beacon 
Press to be protected by the Constitution, the Court 
of Appeals apparently held that neither Senator nor aide 
could be questioned about it because of a common law 
privilege akin to the judicially created immunity of ex-
ecutive officers from liability for libel contained in a 
news release issued in the course of their normal duties. 
See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 ( 1959). This priv-
ilege, fashioned by the Court of Appeals, would not 
Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public 
Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor about things done by 
the Senator in preparation for and intimately related to said meeting. 
"(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own 
actions on June 29, 1971, after having been engaged as a member· 
of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the extent that they were done 
at the Senator's direction either at a meeting of the Subcommittee 
on Public Buildings and Grounds or in preparation for nnd inti-
mately related to snid meeting." 
9 The Court of Appeal~ thought third parties could be questioned 
as to their own conduct regarding the Pentagon Papers, "includ-
ing their dealings with intervenors or hi,; aides." United States v. 
Roe, 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl 1972). The court found no merit 
in the claim that such parties should be shielded from questioning 
under the Speech or Debate Clause concerning their own wrongful 
act~, even if ~uch que~:>tioJJing may bring the Senator's conduct into. 
que:;tion. !d., at 758, n. 2. 
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protect third parties from similar inquiries before the 
grand jury. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the 
protective order to be observed by prosecution and gra.nd 
JUry \Yas: 
" ( 1) K o witness before the gra11d jury currcn tly 
investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers 
may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's 
conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Pub-
lic Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor, 
if the questions arc directed to the motives or pur-
poses behind the Senator's conduct a.t that meet-
ing, about any communications with him or with 
his aides regarding the activities of the Senator 
or his aides during the period of their employment, 
in preparation for and related to said meeting. 
"(2) Dr. Leona.rd S. Rodberg may not be ques-
tioned about his mrn actions in the broadest sense, 
including observat-ions and communications, oral or 
written , by or to him, or coming to his attention 
while being interviewed for, or after having been 
engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal 
staff to the extent that they were in the course 
of his employment." 
The United States petitioned for certiorari challeng-
ing the ruling that aides and other persons may not 
be questioned with respect to legislative acts and that 
an aide to a Member of Congress has a common-law 
privilege not to testify before a grand jury with respect 
to private republication of materials introduced into 
a subcommittee record. Senator Gravel also petitioned 
for certiorari seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals 
insofar as it held private republication Ullprotectecl by 
the Speech or Debate Clause and asserting tha.t the pro-
tective ordN of the Court of Appeals too narrowly 
71-1017 & 71-1026-0PTNION 
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protected against inquiries that a grand jury could direct 
to third parties. We gran ted both petitions. 405 U. S. 
916 (1972). 
I 
Because the claim is that a Member's aide shares 
the Member's constitutional privilege, we consider first 
whether and to what extent Senator Gravel himself is 
exempt from process or inquiry by a grand jury investi-
gating the commission of a crime. Our frame of refer-
C'IlCe is Art. I, ~ 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution: 
"The Senators and Representatives shall receive 
a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained 
by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United 
States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, 
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from 
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of 
their respective Houses, and in going to and re-
turning from tho same; and for any Speech or De-
bate in either House, they shall not be questioned 
in a11y other Place." 
The last sentence of the clause provides Members of 
Congress with two distinct privileges. Except in cases 
of "Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace," the clause 
shiclds Members from arrest "·hile attending or traveling 
to and from a session of their House. History reveals. 
and prior cases so hold. that this part of the clause 
exempts Members from arrest in civil cases only. 
"When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil 
suits 'vere common in America. It is only to such ar-
rests that the provision applies." Long v. Ansell, 293 
U. S. 76, 83 (1034) (footnote omitted). "Since ... 
the terms treason, felony and breach of the peace. as 
used in the constitutional provision relied upon, ex-
cepts from the operation of privilege all criminal offenses, 
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the conclusion results that the claim of privilege of 
exemption from arrest and sentence was without 
merit .... " Williamson v. United Sta.tes, 207 U. S. 
425, 446 (1908).1 0 Nor does freedom from arrest con-
fer immunity on a Member from service of process as 
a defendant in civil matters, Long v. Ansell, supra, at 
82-83, or as a witness in a criminal case. "The Con-
stitution gives to every man, charged with an offense, 
the benefit of compulsory process, to secure the attend-
ance of his witnesses. I do not know of any privilege 
to exempt members of Congress from the service, or 
the obligations, of a. subpoena, in such cases." United 
States v. Cooper, 4 Dall. 340, 341 (1800) (per Chase, J., 
sitting on Circuit). It is, therefore, sufficiently plain 
that the constitutional freedom from arrest does not ex-
empt Members of Congress from the operation of the 
ordinary criminal laws, even though imprisonment may 
prevent or interfere with the performance of their duties 
as Members. Williamson v. United States, supra; cf. 
Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344 (1906). In-
deed, implicit in the narrow scope of the privilege of 
freedom from arrest is. as Jefferson noted, the judgment 
that legislators ought not to stand above the law they 
create but ought generally to be bound by it as are 
ordinary persons. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamenta.ry 
Practice, S. Doc. No. 91- 2437 (1971). 
In recognition, no doubt, of the force of this part of 
Clause 6, Senator Gravel disavo·ws any assertion of gen-
10 Williamson, United States CongrrR~man, had bem found guilty 
of conspiring to commit suborni\tion of prrjnry in connection with 
proceedings for the purchaRe of public land. He objected to the 
court. passing sentence upon him and particularly protested that any 
imprisonment would depri,·c him of his conRtitutional right to "go 
to, attend at and return from the cn~uing session of Congress." 
Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 432-433 (1908). The 
Court rejected the contention that the Speech or Debate Clause freed 
legislators from arcountability for criminal conduct. 
71-1017 & 71-1026-0PINION 
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eral immunity fron1 the criminal law. But he points 
out that the last portion of Clause 6 affords Members 
of Congress another vital privilege-they may not be 
questioned in any other place for any speech or debate 
in either House. The claim is not that while one part 
of Clause 6 generally permits prosecutions for treason, 
felony and breach of the peace, another part neverthe-
less broadly forbids them. Rather, his insistence is 
that the Speech or Debate Clause at the very least pro-
tects him from criminal or civil liability and from ques-
tioning elsewhere than in the Senate, with respect to 
the events occurring at the subcommittee hearing at 
which the Pentagon Papers were introduced into the 
public record. To us this claim is incontrovertible. 
The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a 
coequal branch of the government wide freedom of 
speech, debate and deliberation without intimidation or 
threats from the Executive Branch It thus protects 
Members against prosecutions that directly impinge 
upon or threaten the legislative process. We have no 
doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to an-
swer-either in terms of questions or in terms of de-
fending himself from prosecution-for the events that 
occurred at the subcommittee meeting. Our decision 
is made easier by the fact that the United States ap-
pears to have abandoned whatever position it took to 
the contrary in the lower courts. 
Even so, the United States strongly urges that be-
cause the Speech or Debate Clause confers a privilege 
only upon "Senators and Representatives," Rodberg 
himself has no valid claim to constitutional immunity 
from grand jury inquiry. In our view, both courts 
below correctly rejected this position. We agree with 
the Court of Appeals that for the purpose of construing 
the privilege a Member and his aide are to be "treated 
as one," United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl 
71-1017 & 71-1025-0PINlON 
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1972); or, as the District Court 1mt it: The "Speech or 
Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into things done by 
Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant which 
"·ould have been legislative acts, and therefore priv-
ileged, if performed by the Senator personally." Un·ited 
States Y. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 937-938 (Mass. 1971). 
Both courts recognized what the Senate of the United 
States urgently presses here: that it is literally impos-
sible, in view of the complexities of the modern legis-
lative process, with Congress almost constantly in ses-
sion and matters of legislative concern constantly pro-
liferating. for Members of Congress to perform their 
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; 
that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to 
the Members' performance that they must be treated 
as the latters' alter ego; and that if they are not so 
recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate 
Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by the 
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile 
judiciary, United States Y. Johnson, 383 U. S. 160, 181-
will inevitably be diminished and frustrated. The Court 
has already embraced similar vie\YS in Barr Y. llfalleo, 
360 U. S. 564 (1959), ''"here in immunizing the Acting 
Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization from liabil-
ity for an alleged libel contained in a press release, the 
Court held that the executive privilege recognized in 
prior cases roulcl not be restricted to those of cabinet 
rank. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, "the privilege' 
is not a badge or emolument of exalted office. but an 
expression of a policy designee! to aid in the effccti ve 
functioning of Government. The complexities and mag-
nitude of governmental activity have become so great 
that there must be a delegation and redelcgation. and 
"·e cannot say that these functions become less im-
portant simply because they are exercised by officers of 
lo\\·er rank in the executive hierarchy." !d., at 572- 573. 
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H is true that the clause itself mentions only "Sena-
tors and Representatives," but prior cases have plainly 
not taken a literalistic approach in applying the priv-
ilege. The clause a.lso speaks only of "Speech or De-
bate," Lut the Court's consistent approach has been that 
to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause 
to words spoken in debate \vould be an unacceptably 
narrow view. Committee reports, resolutions. and the 
act, of voting arc equally covered; "riln short, ... 
things generally done in a session of the House by one 
of its members in relation to tho business before it." 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168. 204 (1800), quoted 
with approval in United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 
169,179 (1966). Ratherthangivingtheclauseacramped 
construction, the Court has sought to implement its 
fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from exec-
utive and judicial oversight that realistically threaten 
to control his conduct as a legislator. \Ve have little-
doubt that we arc neither exceeding our judicial powers 
nor mistakenly construing the Constitution by holding 
that tho Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a 
Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of 
the latter would be a protected legislative act if per-
formed by the Member himself. 
Nor can \VO agree \\"ith the United States that our 
conclusion is foreclosed by Knbourn v. 'Thompson, supra, 
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967), and Pow-· 
ell Y. J1fcCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (10G9), where tho· 
speech or debate privilege was hold una vailablo to cer-
tain House and committee employees. Those cases do 
not hold that persons other than Members of Congress 
are beyond tho protection of the clause when they per-
form or aiel in the performance of legislative acts. In 
](. ilbourn, the Speech or Debate Clause protected House 
Members who had adopted a resolution authorizing 
Kilbourn's arrest; that act \Vas clearly legislative in na-
71-1017 & 71-1026-0PINION 
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ture. But tho resolution was subject to judicial review 
insofar as its execution impinged on a citizen's rights as 
it did there. That the House could with in1punity order 
an unconstitutional arrest afforded no protection for 
those who made the arrest. The Court quoted ;vith ap-
proval from Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1. 112 K. B. 
1112 (1839): "So if the Speaker by authority of tho 
House order an illegal act, though that authority shall 
exempt him from question, his order shall no more 
justify the person who executed it than King Charles' 
warrant for levying ship-money could justify his reve-
nue officer." 103 U. S., at 102.1 ' The Speech or Debate 
Clause could not be construed to immunize an illegal 
arrest even though directed by an immune legislative 
act. The Court was careful to point out that tho 
Members themselves were not implicated in the actual 
arrest, id., at 200, and, significantly enough, reserved tho 
question whether there might be circwnstances in which 
"there may . . . be things done, in the one House or 
the other, of an extraordinary character, for which the 
members who take part in the act may be held legally 
responsible." 103 U. S., at 204 (emphasis added). 
Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra, is little different in 
principle. The Speech or Debate Clause there protected 
11 In Kilbou7'n, 103 U. S., at 198, the Court noted a second ex-
ample, used by Mr. Justice Coleridge in Stockdale, 9 Ad. & E., at 
225-226, 112 K. B., at 1196-1197: "'LE't me suppose, b~· way of 
illustration, an extreme case; the House of Commons resolYes that 
any one wearing a dress of a particular manufacture is guilty of a 
brl?ach of privilege, and ordrr::; the arrest of such persons by the 
constable of the parish. An arrr~t is made and action brought, to 
which the order of the HousE' iR plPnded as a justification. . . . In 
such a case as the one supposed, the Jllnintiff's counsel would insist 
on the distinction brtween power and privilege; and no lawyer can 
seriou ·ly doubt that it exists: but the argument confounds them, and 
forbids u~ to enquire, in any particular case, whether it ranges 
under the one or the other. I can find no principle which sanc-
tions this.' " 
71-1017 & 71-1026-0PINION 
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a Senator, who was also a subcommittee chairman , but 
not the subcommittee counsel. The record contained no 
evidence of the Senator's involvement in any activity that 
could result in liability, 387 U. S., at 84, "·hereas the 
committee counsel was charged with conspiring with 
state officials to carry out an illegal seizure of records 
'vhich the committee sought for its own proceedings. 
Ibid. The committee counsel was deemed protected to 
some extent by legislative privilege, but it did not shield 
him from answering as yet unproved charges of conspir-
ing to violate the constitutional rights of private parties. 
Unlawful conduct of this kind the Speech or Debate 
Clause simply did not immunize. 
Powell v. McCormick reasserted judicial power to de-
termine the validity of legislative actions impinging on 
individual rights-there the illegal exclusion of a repre-
sentative-elect-and to afford relief against House aides 
seeking to implement the invalid resolutions. The Mem-
bers themselves were dismissed from the case because 
shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause both from lia-
bility for their illegal legislative act and from having to· 
defend themselves with respect to it. As in Kilbourn, 
the Court did not reach the question "whether under the 
Speech or Debate Clause petitioners would be entitled to 
maintain this action solely against the members of Con-
gress where no agent participated in the challenged action 
and no other remedy was available." 395 U. S., at 506· 
n. 26. 
None of these three cases adopted the simple proposi-
tion that immunity was unavailable to House or com-
mittee employees because they were not Representatives 
or Senators; rather, immunity was unavailable because 
they engaged in illegal conduct which was not entitled to 
Speech or Debate Clause protection. The three cases re-
flect a decidedly jaundiced view towards extending the 
clause so as to privilege illegal or unconstitutional con-
71-1017 & 71-1025-0PINTON 
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duct beyond that essential to foreclose executive control 
of legislative speech or debate and associated matters such 
as voting and committee reports and proceedings. In 
Kilbourn, the Sergeant-at-Arms was executing a legisla-
tive order, the issuance of which fell within the Speech or 
Debate Clause; in Eastland, the committee counsel was 
gathering information for a hearing; and in Powell, the 
Clerk and Doorkeeper '"ere merely carrying out directions 
that were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. In 
each case, protecting the rights of others may have to 
some extent frustrated a planned or com.pletecl legislative· 
act; but relief could be afforded without proof of a legis-
lative act or the motives or purposes underlying such an 
act. No threat to legislative independence was posedr 
and Speech or Debate Clause protection did not attach. 
None of this, as we see it, involves distinguishing be-
t,Yeen a Senator and his personal aides with respect to· 
legislative im.munity. In Kilbourn-type situations, both 
aide and Member should be immune with respect to com-
mittee and House action leading to the illegal resolution .. 
So too in Eastland, as in this case, senatorial aides should 
enjoy immunity for helping a Member conduct committee 
hearings. On the other hand, no prior case has held 
that Members of Congress \Yould be immune if they 
execute an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out 
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for 
a hearing, themselves seize the property or invade the· 
privacy of a citizen. Neither they nor their aides should 
be immune from liability or questioning in such circum-
stances. Such acts are no more essential to legislating 
than the conduct held unprotected in United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).'~ 
12 Senator Gran·l is willin~ to n~~nme th:1t if hr prr~onnlly had 
"~tolen" the Prntngon Pnprr~, and thnt art \Yrrr n rrime, he could 
be pro~ecutecl , :1s could nides or other as.-;i R tnnt~ who J)fll'tirip:1tecl 
in the theft. Consolidated Brief of Senator GraYrl 9:1. 
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The United States fears the abuses that history re-
veals have occurred when legislators are invested with 
the power to relieve others from the operation of other-
wise valid civil and criminal laws. But these abuses, it 
seems to us. are for the most part obviated if the privilege 
applicable to the aid is viewed, as it must be, as the 
privilege of the Senator, and invocable only by the Sen-
ator or by the aide on the Senator's behal£,1 " and if in all 
events the privilege available to the aide is confined to 
those services that "·ould be immune legislative conduct 
if performed by the Senator himself. This view places 
beyond the Speech or Debate Clause a variety of services 
characteristically 11erformecl by aides for Members of 
Congress, even though within the scope of their employ-
mont. It like\\"ise provides no protection for criminal 
conduct threatening the security of tho person or property 
of others. \\"hether performed at the direction of the 
Senator in preparation for or in execution of a legislative 
act or done \\"ithout his knowledge or direction. Neither 
docs it immunize Senator or aide from testifying at trials 
or grand jury proceedings involving third-party crimes 
\\"here the questions do not require testimony about or 
impugn a legislative act. Thus our refusal to distinguish 
bct\\"een Senator and aide in applying the Speech or De-
bate Clause does not mean that Rodborg is for all pur-
pose exempt from grand jury questioning. 
II 
\Ye are convinced also that the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly determined that Senator Gravel's alleged arrange-
ment with Beacon Press to publish the Pentagon Papers 
was not protected speech or debate within the meaning 
of Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution. 
13 It folloii"H that nn nidC''s claim of pri\·iiPgC' rnn be repuclintC'd and 
thus waived b~· tllC' Senator. 
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Historically the English legislative privilege was not 
viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise im-
mune libel on the floor of the House. Stockdale v. Han-
sard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 114, 112 K. B. 1112, 1156 (1839), 
recognized that "for speeches made in Parliament by a 
member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous 
to public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity." 
But it was clearly stated that "if the calumnious or 
infiamatory speeches should be reported and published, 
the law will attach responsibility on the publisher." 14 
This was accepted in Kilbourn v. Thompson as a "sound 
statement of the legal effect of the Bill of Rights and of 
the parliamentary law of England" and as a reasonable 
basis for inferring "that the framers of the Constitution 
meant the same thing by the use of language borrowed 
from that source." 103 U. S., at 202. 
Prior cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause 
"broadly to effectuate its purposes," United States v . 
.Johnson, 383 U. S., at 180, and have included within its 
reach anything "generally done in a session of the House 
by one of its members in relation to the business before 
14 Stockdale extrnsi,·cly reviewed ihe preccdcntH and thrir inter-
play with the privilege so forcefully recognized in the Bill of Rights 
of 1689: "That the freedom of speech, and debate~ or proceedings 
in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or queRtioned in any court 
or place out of Parliament." 1 W. & M., Scss. 2, c. 2. From these 
cases, including Rex v. Creevy, 1 M. & S. 273, 105 Eng. Rrp. 104 
(1813); Rex v. Wright, 8 T. R. 292, 101 K. B. 1396 (1799); Rex v. 
Abingdon, 1 ESP. 225, N. P. Cas. 337 (1795); Rex v. Williams, 2 
Show. K. B. 471, 89 Eng. Rep. 1048, it is apparent that to the 
extent English precedent is relevent to the Speech or Debate Clause 
there is little, if any, support for Senator Gravel's position with 
rc~pect to republication. Parliament reacted to Stockdale v. Ilansard 
by adopting the Parliamentary Pnprrs Act of 1840,3 and 4 Viet., c. 9, 
which stayed proceeding::; in all ca~rs wherr it eould be shown that 
publication was by order of a HouRe of Parli:uncnt and wns a bona 
fide report, printed and circulated without malice. Sec generally 
C. Wittke, The Ili~tory of Enp;lish Parliamentary Prh·ilcgc (1921). 
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it." Kilbourn v. 'Phompson, 102 U. S., at 204; United 
States v. Johnson, 383 U. S., at 179. Thus, voting by 
Members and committee reports are protected; and we· 
recognize today-as the Court has recognized before, 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 204; Tenney v .. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-378 (1951)-that a Mem-
ber's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although 
subject to judicial review in various circumstances, as is 
legislation itself, may not be made the basis for a civil 
or crin1inal judgment against a Member because that 
conduct is within the "sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity. !d., at 376.1 " 
But the clause has not been extended beyond the legis-
lative sphere. That Senators generally perform certain 
acts in their official capacity as Senators does not neces-
sarily make all such acts legislative in nature. Members 
of Congress are constantly in touch with the Executive 
Branch of the Government and with administrative 
agencies-they may cajol and exhort with respect to the 
administration of a federal statute-but such conduct, 
though generally clone, is not protected legislative activity. 
United States v. Johnson decided at least this much. 
"No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be 
successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause 
reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to 
influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise 
15 The Comt in Tenney, 341 U. S., at 375-377, was equally clear 
that "lrgislative art ivity" is not all-encompas~ing, nor may its limits 
be established by the LegislatiYe Branch: "Legislatures may not of 
cour:;c acquire power by an unwarranted extension of privilege. The 
House of Common'~ claim of power to establish the limits of its 
privilege has been little more than a preten~e since Ashby v. White, 
2 Ld. Raym. 93 , 3 id., 20. This Court has not hesitated to <m~­
tain the rights of private incli\·iduab when it. found Congress was 
acting outside its legislative role. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 
158; Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521; compare McGrain v .. 
Daughaty, 273 U.S. 135, 175." 
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related to the clue functioning of the legislative process." 
383 U. S., at 172. Cf. Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 
444,367-368 (1906). 
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart 
of the clause is speech or debate in either House, and in-
sofar as the clause is construed to reach other matters, 
they must be an integral part of the deliberative and 
communicative processes by which Members participate 
in committee and House proceedings with respect to the 
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legis-
lation or with respect to other matters which the Consti-
tution places within the jurisdiction of either House. As 
the Court of Appeals put it, the cotirts have extended 
the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate 
in either House, but "only when necessary to prevent in-
direct impairment of such deliberations." United States 
v. Doe, 455 F. 2cl 753, 760 (CAl 1972). 
Here private publication by Senator Gravel through 
the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way essen-
tial to the deliberations of the House; nor docs ques-
tioning as to private publication threaten the integrity 
or illClrpenclencc of the House by impermissibly expos-
ing its deliberations to executive influence. The Senator 
had conducted his hearings, the record and any report 
that was forthcoming were available both to his com-
mittee and the House. Neither Congress nor the full 
committee ordered or authorized the publication; incleed, 
the chairman of the full committee refused to request 
it. We can not but conclude that the Senator's arrange-
ments 'vith Beacon Press were not part and parcel of 
the legislative process. 
There are additional considerations. Article I, ~ 6, 
cl. 1, as we have emphasized, does not purport to confer 
a general exemption upon Members of Congress from 
liability or process in criminal cases. Quite the con-
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trary is true. While the Speech or Debate Clause rec-
ognizes speech, voting and other lrgislative acts as 
exempt from liability that might other\\·ise attach, it 
dors not privilege either Senator or aide to violate an 
othcrwi:-e valid criminal law in preparing for or imple-
menting legislative acts. If republication of these clas-
sified papers was a crime under an Act of Congress, it 
\vas not entitled to immunity under the Speech or De-
bate Clause. It also appears that the grand jury was 
pursuing this very subject in the normal course of a 
valid investigation. The Speech or Debate Clause does 
not in our vie\\· extend immunity to Rodberg, as a Sen-
ator's aide, from testifying before the grand jury about 
the arrangement between Senator Gravel and Beacon 
Press or about his own participation, if any, in the 
a.Jlcged transaction. 
III 
Similar considerations lead us to disagree with the 
Court of Appeals insofar as it fashioned, tentatively at 
least. a nonconstitutional testimonial privilege protect-
ing Rodberg from any questioning by the grand jury 
concerning the matter of republication of the Pentagon 
Papers. This privilege, thought to be similar to that 
protecting executive officials from liability for libel, cf. 
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (HJ59), was considered 
advisable "to the extent a congressman has responsibil-
ity to inform his constituents." But we cannot carry 
a judicially fashioned privilege so far as to immunize 
criminal conduct or to frustrate the grand jury's inquiry 
into whether publication of these classified documents 
violated an Act of Congress. The so-ca.Ued executive 
privilege has never been applied to shield executive of-
ficers from prosecution for crime, the Court of Appeals 
was quite sure that third parties were neither immune 
from liability nor from testifying about the republica-
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tion matter and we perceive no basis for conferring a 
testimonial privilege on Rodberg as the Court of Appeals 
seemed to do. 
IV 
We must finally consider, in the light of the fore-
going, whether the protective order entered by the Court 
of Appeals is an appropriate regulation of the pending 
grand jury proceedings. 
Focusing first on paragraph two of the order, we think 
the injunction against interrogating Rodberg with respect 
to any act, "in the broadest sense," performed by him 
within the scope of his employment, overly restricts 
the scope of grand jury inquiry. Rodberg's immunity, 
testimonial or otherwise, extends only to legislative acts 
as to which the Senator himself would be immune. The 
grand jury, therefore, if relevant to its investigation 
into the possible violations of the criminal law and 
absent Fifth Amendment objections, may require from 
Rodberg answers to questions relating to his or the 
Senator's arrangements, if any, with respect to repub-
lication or with respect to third party conduct under 
valid investigation by the grand jury, as long as the 
questions do not implicate legislative action of the Sen-
ator. Neither do we perceive any constitutional or other 
privilege that shields Rodberg, any more than any other 
witness, from grand jury questions relevant to tracing 
the source of obviously highly classified documents that 
came into the Senator's possession and arc the basic 
subject matter of inquiry in this case. 
Because the Speech or Debate Clause privilege ap-
plies both to Senator and aide, it appears to us that 
paragraph one of the order, alone, would afford ample 
protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any 
witness, including Rod berg: ( 1) concerning the Sen-
ator's conduct, or the conduct of his aides, at the June 29, 
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1971, meeting of the subcommittee; 16 (2) concerning-
the motives and purposes behind the Senator's conduct, 
or that of his aides, at that meeting; (3) concerning 
communications between the Senator and his aides dur-
ing the term of their employment and related to said 
meeting or any other legislative act of the Senator; 
( 4) except as proves relevant to investigating possible 
third party crime, concerning any act, in itself not crim-
inal, performed by the Senator, or by his aides in the 
course of their employment, in preparation for the sub-
committee hearing. We leave the final form of such 
an order to the Court of Appeals in the first instance, or,. 
if that court prefers, to the District Court. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated 
and the case is remanded to that court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
16 Having established that neither the Senator nor Rodberg is 
subject to liability for what occurred at the subcommittee hearing, 
we perceive no basis for inquiry of either Rodberg or third parties 
on this subject. If it prove· material to establish for the record the 
fact of publication at the subcommittee hearing, which seems un-
disputed, the public record of the hearing would appear sufficient 
for this purpose. We do not intend to imply, however, that in no 
grand jury investigations or criminal trials of third parties may 
third-party witnesses be interrogated about legislative acts of Mem-
bers of Congress. 
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~~ [June --:' 1972] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the / /) 
7 Court. v 
These cases arise out of the investigation by a federal ~
grand jury into possible criminal conduct with respect 
to the release and publication of a classified Defense ~ 1/--L.~ 
Department study entitled "History of the United States l J 
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." This 
document, popularly known as the "Pentagon Papers," 
bore a Defense security classification of Top Secret-
Sensitive. The crimes being investigated included the 
retention of public property or records with intent to 
convert (18 U. S. C. § 641) , the gathering and trans-
mitting of national defense information (18 U. S. C. 
§ 793), the concealment or removal of public records 
or documents (18 U. S. C. § 2071), and conspiracy to 
commit such offenses and to defraud the United States 
(18 U. S. C. § 371). 
Among the witnesses subpoenaed were Leonard S. 
Rodberg, an assistant to Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska 
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alld a residellt fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies, 
and Howard Webber, Director of M. I. T. Press. Sen-
ator Gravel, as intervenor,' filed motions to quash the 
subpoenas and to require the Government to specify 
the parbcular questions to be addressed to Roclberg. 2 
He asserted that requiring these \Yitnesses to appear and 
testify would violate his privilege under the Speech or 
Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, 
§ 6, Cl. 1. 
It appeared that on the night of June 29, 1971, Sen-
ator Gravel, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Build-
ings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works Commit-
teC', ronvened a meeting of the subcommittee ancl thC're 
read extensively from a copy of the Pentagon Papers. 
1 The District Court prrmittrd Srnator Gmvcl to intpn•ene in 
i he procerclin~ on Dr. n odhrrg's motion to quash the subpoena. 
ordering his appearanrr before the grand jur~· and acceptrd motions 
from Gravel lo qunsh the snbpoena nnd to ~perif~· the exact nature 
of the questions to he n~kccl Hodhrrg. The Govrrnment contested 
Gmvel's stnnding to appral the trial court's di~position of these 
motions on thr ground thnt, hnd the suhpoenn brcn directed to the 
Scnntor, hr could not k11·r appc:llrcl from a denial of a motion to 
quash without first rrfu~ing to comply with the subpoenn and being 
held in contempt. Un£ted States v. Ryan, 402 U. S .. 580 ( 1971); 
C'nbblrdick v. United States, 30!) U. S. 328 (1940). Thr Court of 
Appmls, United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2cl 753, 756-757 (CAl 1972), 
held that becnnse thr subporna was dirrctrcl to third p:utirs, who· 
could not be counted on to risk contempt to protert intervenor's 
rights, Gravel might be "11owerle~~ to a\·rrt the mischief of the-
order" if not permitted to appral, citing Perlman v. United States, 
247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918). Thr United States dors not here challenge 
the propriety of the appcnl. 
2 Dr. Rodberg, who filed hi,; own motion to qua~h the subpoena 
clirt>rtiug hiR nppearancr and tr.:,iimon~·. :t.ppran·d :t~ amir-us l"?n·iae 
both in the Court of Appeals nnd this Court. Technically, Rodberg 
st:1tes, he is :i party 1o 71-102G, in~ofar as the Government appeals 
from the protective order c•ntcred b~· the District Comt. However, 
~inre Gravel intervened, Rodbcrg docs not press the point. Brief 
of Leonard S. Roclberg as Amicus Curiae 2, n. 2. 
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lie then placed the entire 47 volumes of the study 1n 
the public record. Rodbcrg had been added to the 
Senator's staff earlier in the day and assisted Gravel 
in preparing for and cm1ducting the hearing.~ Some 
weeks later there 'verc press reports that Gravel had 
arranged for the papers to be published by Beacon 
Press • and that members of Gravel's staff had talked 
with Webber as editor of M. I. T. Press." 
The Diskict Court overruled the motions to quash 
and to i"pccify questions but entered an order proscrib-
ing certain categories of questions. United Stales v. 
Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (Mass. 1971). The Govern-
ment's contention that for purposes of applying the 
Speech or Debate Clause the courts were free to inquire 
into the regularity of the subcommittee meeting was 
rejccted.0 Because the Clause protected all legislative 
~The District Court found "thflt, 'a~ 1wr~onal fl~sistant to mm·ant 
I Gravel], Dr. Rodhrrg a~si~trd in preparinl!: for disclo~urc and snh-
srqucntl:v disclo~ing to mO\·:mt's collragnrs and constitntents, at a 
hearing of the Srnatc Subcommittee on Public Buildim;s nnd Grounds. 
1 he contents of the so-en !led "Pcntal!;on Pnpers," which were rritical 
of the Exrentivr'R conduct in the field of forrign rrlntions.'" United 
States Y. Doe, :3:32 F. Rupp. 9:30, 9:-J2 (Mn~~- 1971). 
4 Brncon Prrss is a cli1·i~ion of thr Unitari:m Uni1·er~alist Associa-
tion, which appe:nrcl herr ns amicus curiae in ~upport of the position 
t:d;:en by Srna.tor Gmvrl. 
5 Gravrl so allrgrd in hi~ motion to intrrvrnc in thr Webbrr 
matter nnd to quash thr subpoenn orderinl!; 'Vebber to appear and 
teslif)'. App. 15-18. 
G The Govrrnmrnt mninbined that Congre~s does not rnjoy un-
limited power 1 o conduct hu~inrss nnd that. judicial review has often 
hrrn exercised to curb ext ra-lru;i~lat ivc incursions by legislative com-
mittees, ritinl!; Watkins v. United Statl's, 3.')4 U. S. 178 (Hl57); 
McGrain v. Dau(Jherty, 273 U. 8. 135 (1927); Ilrntoff v. !chord, 
:31R F. Supp. 1175 \ C'ADC 1970), at lrast where E<uch inrur~ions are 
unrebted to a lei!; it imat c lel!;islative purpo~c. It was allrl!;cd that 
Gravel hnd "eonYenrcl a sprcinl, unnuthorizrd nnd untimely meeting 
of the Srnntr Suhcommittre on Public Works (at midnight on 
.Juno 29, 1971), for the purpose of reading the documents and there-
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acts, it was held to :::hield from iuquiry anything the 
Senator did at the subcommittee meeting and "certain 
acts done in 11reparation therefor." Id., at 935. The 
Senator's privilege also prohibited "inquiry into things 
done by Roclberg as the Senator's aide or assistant which 
would have been legislative acts, and therefore priv-
ileged, if performed by the Senator personally." ld., 
at 937-938. 7 The trial court, however, held the private 
republication of the documents was not privileged by 
the Speech or Debate C'lause.8 
nfter placed all unread portion~ in the subcommittee rrcord, with 
Dr. Rodb0rg soliciting puhlication aftrr the mE'rting." App. 9. Tf1e 
District Court rejectNl ihr rontrntion: "Senator Gnwd has sug-
gc~tcd that the availability of fund~ for thr construction and im-
provemrnt of public buildings and grounds has been affected by the 
necessary costs of thE' war in Vietnam and that therrfore thr de-
velopment and conduct of thr "'ar is proprrly within the concern 
of the subcommittee. The court rejrcts the Governmrnt's a rgu-
mrnt without detailed c•on~idcration of the merits of the Senator's 
position, on the basi~ of thr grnrral rule restricting inquiry into 
matters of legislative purpo~r and OJWmt ions." United States v. 
Doe, 332 F. Suw. 930, 935 (Mass. 1971). Cases such as Watkins, 
supra, were distinguishrd on the ground that they concerned the 
power of Congress under the Constitution: "It has not been sug-
gested by the government that the subcommittee itself is unauthor-
ized, nor that the "·ar in Virtnam is an i8SUE' beyond the purview of 
congre::;sional debate and artion. Also, the individu:1l rights at 
stake in these proceedings arc not those of a witness before a ron-
gressional committee or of a subjrct of a committee's investigntion, 
but only those of a congressman and member of his personal staff 
who claim 'intimidation by the executive.'" !d., at 73G. 
7 The District Court thought that Rod berg could be questioned 
concerning his own condurt prior to joining the Scna tor';; stafT and 
concerning the activitie~ of third p:1rties with whom Rodberg and 
Gravel dealt. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 934 (Mass. 
1971). 
8 The protective order entered by the District Court provided as 
follows: 
"(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating thc 
release of the Pentagon Papers may be questioned about Senator 
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the mo-
tions to quash but modified the protective order to 
reflect its own views of the scope of the congressional 
privilege. United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753 (CAl 
1972) . Agreeing that Senator and aide were one for 
the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause and that 
the Clause foreclosed inquiry of both Senator a.ncl aide 
with respect to legislative acts, the Court of AP11eals 
also viewed the privilege as barring direct inquiry of 
the Senator or his aide, but not of third parties, as to 
the sources of the Senator's information used in per-
forming legislative duties.n Although it did not con-
sider private republication by the Senator or Beacon 
Press to be protected by the Constitution, the Court 
of Appeals apparently held that neither Senator nor aide 
could be questioned about it because of a common law 
privilege akin to the judicially created immunity of ex-
ecutive officers from liability for libel contained in a 
news release issued in the course of their normal duties. 
Sec Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959). This priv-
ilege, fashioned by the Court of Appeals, would not 
Mike Gravel's conduct at a merting of the Subcommittee on Public 
Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor about things done by 
the Senator in preparation for and intimately related to said meeting. 
"(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodbcrg may not be qurstioned about his own 
actions on June 29, 1971, after having been engaged as a member 
of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the eA"tent that they were done 
at the Senator's direction either at a meeting of the Subcommittee 
on Public Buildings and Grounds or in preparation for and inti-
mntcly related to said meeting." 
0 The Court of Appeals thought third parties could be questioned 
as to their own conduct rrgarding the Pentagon Papers, "includ-
ing their dealings with intervenors or his aides." United States v. 
Doe. 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl 1972). The court found llo mr rit 
in the claim that such parties should be shielded from questioning 
under the Speech or Debate Clause concerning their own wrongful 
acts, even if such questioning may bring the Senator's conduct into. 
question. Id., at 758, n. 2. 
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protect third parties from similar inquiries before the 
grand jury. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the 
protective order to be observed by prosecution and grand 
,1ury was: 
" ( 1) No witness before the grand jury currently 
investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers 
may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's 
conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Pub-
lic Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1071, nor, 
if the questions are directed to the motives or pur-
poses behind the Senator's conduct at that meet-
ing, about any communications with him or with 
his aides rega.rding the activities of the Senator 
or his aides during the period of their employment, 
in preparation for and related to said meeting. 
"(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be ques-
tioned about his own actions in the broadest sense, 
including observations and communications, oral or 
written, by or to him, or coming to his attention 
while being interviewed for, or after having been 
engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal 
staff to the extent that they were in the course 
of his employment." 
The United States petitioned for certiorari cha.lleng-
ing the ruling that ajdes and other persons may not 
be questioned with respect to legislative acts a11d that 
an aide to a Member of Congress has a common-law 
privilege not to testify before a grand jury with respect 
to private republication of materials introduced into 
a subcommittee record. Senator Gravel also petitioned 
for certiorari seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals 
insofar as it held private republication unprotected by 
the Speech or Debate Clause and asserting that the pro-
tective order of the Court of Appeals too na.rrowly 
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protected against inquiries that a grand jury could direct 
to third parties. We granted both petitions. 405 U. S. 
916 (1972). 
I 
Because the claim is that a Member's aide shares 
the Member's constitutional privilege, we consider first 
whether and to what extent Senator Gravel himself is 
exempt from process or inquiry by a grand jury investi-
gating the commission of a crim.e. Our frame of refer-
ence is Art. I, ~ 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution: 
"The Senators and Representatives shall receive 
a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained 
by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United 
States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, 
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from 
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of 
their respective Houses, and in going to and re-
turning from the same; and for any Speech or De-
bate in either House, they shall not be questioned 
in any other Place." 
The last sentence of the clause provides Members of 
Congress with two distinct privileges. Except in cases 
of "Treason , Felony and Breach of the Peace," the clause 
shie-lds Members from arrest while attending or traveling 
to and from a session of their House. History reveals, 
and prior cases so hold, that this part of the clause 
exempts MC'mbers from arrest in civil cases only. 
"When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil 
suits were common in America. It is only to such ar-
rests that the provision applies." Long v. Ansell, 293 
U. S. 76, 83 (1934) (footnote omitted). "Since ... 
the terms treason , felony and breach of the peace, as 
used in the constitutional provision relierl upon, ex-
cepts from the operation of privilege all criminal offenses, 
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the conclusion results that the claim of privilege of 
exemption from arrE'st and sentence wa.s without 
merit .... " Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 
425, 446 ( 1908) .10 Nor does freedom from arrest con-
fer immunity on a Member from service of process as 
a defendant in civil matters, Long v. Ansell, supra, at 
82- 83, or as a witness in a criminal case. "The Con-
stitution gives to every man, charged with an offense, 
the benefit of compulsory process, to secure the attend-
ance of his witnesses. I do not know of any privilege 
to exempt members of Congress from the service, or 
the obligations, of a subpoena, in such cases." United 
States v. Cooper, 4 Dall. 340, 341 ( 1800) (per Chase, J., 
sitting on Circuit). It is, therefore, sufficiently plain 
that the constitutional freedom from arrest does not ex-
empt Members of Congress from the operation of the 
ordinary criminal laws, even though imprisonment may 
prevent or interfere with the performance of their duties 
as Members. Williamson v. United States, supra; cf. 
Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344 (1906). In-
deed, implicit in the narrow scope of the privilege of 
freedom from arrest is, as Jefferson noted, the judgment 
that legislators ought not to stand above the law they 
create but ought generally to be bound by it as are 
ordinary persons. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary 
Practice, S. Doc. No. 91- 2 437 (1971). 
In recognition, no doubt, of the force of this part of 
Clause 6, Senator Gravel disavows any assertion of gen-
10 Williamson, United States Congressmnn, had been found guilty 
of conRpiring to commit subornation of perjury in connection with 
proceedings for the purchnsc of public lnnd. He objected to the 
court passing sentence upon him and pnrtirularly protested that any 
imprisonment would deprive him of his ronstitutionnl right to "go 
to, attend at and return from the cusHing session of Congress." 
Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 432-433 (1908). The 
Court rejected the contention that the Speech or Debate Clnuse freed 
legi ·lators from accountability for criminal conduct. 
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eral immunity from the criminal law. But he points 
out that the last portion of Clause 6 affords Members 
of Congress another vital privilege-they may not be 
questioned in any other place for any speech or debate 
in either House. The claim is not that while one part 
of Clause 6 generally permits prosecutions for treason r 
felony and breach of the peace, another part neverthe-
less broadly forbids them. Rather, his insistence is 
that the Speech or Debate Clause at the very least pro-
tects him from criminal or civil liability and from ques-
tioning elsewhere than in the Senate, with respect to 
the events occurring at the subcommittee hearing at 
which the Pentagon Papers were introduced into the 
public record. To us this claim is incontrovertible. 
The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a 
coequal branch of the government wide freedom of 
speech, debate and deliberation without intimidation or 
threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects 
Members against prosecutions that directly impinge 
upon or threaten the legislative process. We have no 
doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to an-
swer-either in terms of questions or in terms of de-
fending himself from prosecution-for the events that 
occurred at the subcommittee meeting. Our decision 
is made easier by the fact that the United States ap-
pears to have abandoned whatever position it took to· 
the contrary in the lower courts. 
Even so, the United States strongly urges that be-
cause the Speech or Debate Clause confers a privilege 
only upon "Senators and Representatives," Rodberg 
himself has no valid claim to constitutional immunity 
from grand jury inquiry. In our view, both courts 
below correctly rejected this position. We agree with 
the Court of Appeals that for the purpose of construing 
the privilege a Member and his aide are to be "treated 
as one," United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl 
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1072); or, as the District Court put it: The "Speech or 
Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into things done by 
Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant which 
would have been legislative acts, and therefore priv-
ileged, if performed by the Senator personally." United 
States Y. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 937-938 (Mass. 1971). 
Both courts recognized \',:hat the Senate of the United 
States urgently presses here: that it is literally impos-
sible, in view of the complexities of the modern legis-
lative process, with Congress almost constantly in ses-
sion and matters of legislative concern constantly pro-
liferating, for Members of Congress to perform their 
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; 
that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to 
the Members' performance that they must be treated 
as the latters' alter ego; and that if they are not so 
recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate 
Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by the 
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile 
judiciary, United States Y. Joh11son, 383 U. S. 160, 181-
will inevitably be diminished and frustrated. 
The Court has already embraced similar views in Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), "·here in immunizing the 
Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization from 
liability for a.n alleged libel contained in a press relca~c, 
the Court held that the executive privilege recogni;,cd in 
prior cases could not be restricted to those of cabinet 
rank. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan , "the privilege' 
is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but n.n 
expression of a policy designed to aiel in the effective 
functioning of Government. The complexities and mag-
nitude of governmental activity have become so great 
that there must be a delegation and redelegation, and 
we cannot say that these functions become less im-
portant simply because they arc exercised by officers of 
lo\\'er rank in the executive hierarchy." !d., at 572- 573_ 
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It is true that the clause itself mentions only "Sena-
tors and Representatives," but prior cases have plainly 
not taken a literalistic approach in applying the priv-
ilege. The clause also speaks only of "Speech or De-
bate," but the Court's consistent approach has been that 
to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause 
to words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably 
narrow view. Committee reports, resolutions, and the 
act of voting arc equally covered; "[iln short, ... 
things generally done in a session of the House by one 
of its members in relation to the business before it." 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S.168, 204 (1880), quoted 
with approval in United States v. Jolmson, 383 U. S. 
169, 179 (1966). Rather than giving the clause a cramped 
construction, the Court has sought to implement its 
fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from exec-
utive and judicial oversight that realistically threaten 
to control his conduct as a legislator. We have little 
doubt that we are neither exceeding our judicial powers 
nor mistakenly construing the Constitution by holding 
that the Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a 
Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of 
the latter would be a protected legislative act if per-
formed by the Member himself. 
Nor cau we agree with the United States that our 
conclusion is foreclosed by Kilbow·n Y. Thonl]Json, supra, 
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967), and Pow-
ell Y. McConnack, 395 U. S. 48G (1969), where the 
speech or debate privilege was held unavailable to cer-
tain House and committee employees. Those cases do 
not hold that persons other than Members of Congress 
are beyond the protection of the clause when they per-
form or aid in the performance of legislative acts. In 
Kilbourn, the Speech or Debate Clause protected HouBc 
Members who had adopted a rcsolu tion authorizing 
Kilbourn's arrest; that act was clearly legislative in na-
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ture. But the resolution was subject to judicial reviev,· 
insofar as its execution impinged on a citizen's rights as 
it did there. That the House could with impunity ordet-
an unconstitutional arrest afforded no protection for 
those who made the arrest. The Court quoted with ap-
proval from Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 112 K. B. 
1112 (1839): "So if the Speaker by authority of the 
House order an illegal act, though that authority shall 
exempt him from question, his order shall no more 
justify the person who executed it than King Charles' 
\varrant for levying ship-money could justify his reve-
nue officer." 103 U.S., at 102.11 The Speech or Debate 
Clause could not be construed to immunize an illegal 
arrest even though directed by an immune legislative 
act. The Court was careful to point out that the 
Members themselves were not implicated in the actual 
arrest, id., at 200, and, significantly enough, reserved the 
question whether there might be circumstances in which 
"there may ... be things done, in the one House or 
the other, of an extraordinary character, for which the 
members who take part in the act may be held legally 
responsible." 103 U. S., at 204 (emphasis added). 
Dombrowski v. Eastland, supm, is little different in 
principle. The Speech or Debate Clause there protected 
11 In Kilbourn, 103 U. S., at 198, the Court noted a second ex-
mnple, used by Mr. Justice Coleridge in Stockdale, 9 Ad. & E., at 
225-226, 112 K. B., at 1196-1197: " 'Let me suppo~e, by way of 
illustration, an extreme case; the House of Common~ resolves that 
any one wearing a dress of a particular manufacture is gnilty of a 
breach of privilege, and ordrr~ the arrest of such per~ons by the 
constable of the parish. An arrest i~ made and action brought, to 
which the order of the House is pleaded as a ju~tification. . . . In 
such a case as the one suppo~ed, the plaintiff'~ counsel would insist 
on the distinction between power and privilege; and no lawyer can 
seriously doubt that it exists: but the argument confound~ them, and 
forbids us to enquire, in any particular case, whether it ranges 
under the one or the other. I can find no principle which sanc-
tions this.' " 
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a Senator, who was also a subcommittee chairman , but 
not the subcommittee counsel. The record contained no· 
evidence of the Senator's involvement in any activity that 
could result in liability, 387 U. S., at 84, whereas the 
committee counsel was charged with conspiring with 
state officials to carry out an illegal seizure of records 
which the committee sought for its own proceedings. 
Ibid. The committee counsel was deemed protected to· 
some extent by legislative privilege, but it did not shield 
him from answering as yet unproved charges of conspir-
ing to violate the constitutional rights of private parties. 
Unlawful conduct of this kind the Speech or Debate 
Clause simply did not immunize. 
Powell v. McCormick reasserted judicial power to de-
termine the validity of legislative actions impinging on 
individual rights-there the illegal exclusion of a repre-
sentative-elect- and to afford relief against House aides 
seeking to implement the invalid resolutions. The Mem-
bers themselves were dismissed from the case because 
shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause both from lia-
bility for their illegal legislative act and from having to 
defend themselves with respect to it. As in Kilbourn, 
the Court did not reach the question "whether under the 
Speech or Debate Clause petitioners would be entitled to 
maintain this action solely against the members of Con-
gress where no agent participated in the challenged action 
and no other remedy was available." 395 U. S., at 506 
n. 26. 
None of these three cases adopted the simple proposi-
tion that immunity was unavailable to House or com-
mittee employees because they were not Representatives 
or Senators; rather, immunity was unavailable because· 
they engaged in illegal conduct which was not entitled to 
Speech or Debate Clause protection. The three cases re-
flect a decidedly jaundiced view towards extending the 
clause so as to privilege illegal or unconstitutional con-· 
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duct beyond that essential to foreclose executive control 
of legislative speech or debate and associated matters such 
as voting and committee reports and proceedings. In 
Kilbourn, the Sergeant-at-Arms was executing a legisla-
tive order, the issuance of which fell within the Speech or 
Debate Clause; in Eastland, the committee counsel was 
gathering information for a hearing; and in Powell, the 
Clerk and Doorkeeper were merely carrying out directions 
that were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. In 
each case, protecting the rights of others may have to 
some extent frustrated a planned or completed legislative 
act; but relief could be afforded without proof of a legis-
lative act or the motives or purposes underlying such an 
act. No threat to legislative independence was posed, 
and Speech or Debate Clause protection did not attach. 
None of this, as we sec it, involves distinguishing be-
tween a Senator and his personal aides with respect to 
legislative immunity. In Kilbourn-type situations, both 
aide and Member should be immune with respect to com-
mittee and House action leading to the illegal resolution. 
So too in Eastland, as in this case, senatorial aides should 
enjoy immunity for helping a Member conduct committee 
hearings. On the other hand, no prior case has held 
that Members of Congress would be immune if they 
execute an im·alicl resolution by themselves carrying out 
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for 
a hearing, themselves seize the property or invade the· 
privacy of a citizen. Keithcr they nor their aides should 
be immune from liability or questioning in such circum-
stances. Such acts are no more essential to legislating 
than the conduct held unprotected in United Slates v. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. 160 (1966).'~ 
1 ~ Rcnator Gra\·PI is willing to :1~~umc that if he per~onally had 
"~tolen" the Pentagon Papers, nnd that act. wcrr n f'rimr, he eould 
be prosecuted, as f'ould aid<'~ or other assistant~ who participated 
in the theft. Cousolidated Brief of Srnator G r:n·cl 93. 
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The United States fears the abuses that history re-
veals have occurred when legislators are invested with 
the power to relieve others from the operation of other-
wise valid civil and criminal laws. But these abuses, it 
seems to us, arc for the most part obviated if the privilege 
applicable to the aide is viewed, as it must be, a!' the 
privilege of the Senator, and invocable only by the Sen-
ator or by the aide on the Senator's behalf,"' and if in all 
events the privilege available to the aide is confined to 
those services that would be immune legislative conduct 
if performed by the Senator himself. This view places 
beyond the Speech or Debate Clause a variety of services 
characteristically performed by aides for Members of 
Congress, even though within the scope of their employ-
ment. It likewise provides no protection for criminal 
conduct threatening the security of the person or property 
of others, whether performed at the direction of the 
Senator in preparation for or in execution of a legislative 
act or done without his knowledge or direction. Neither 
does it immuni"'e Senator or aide from testifying at trials 
or grand jmy proceedings involving third-party crimes 
where the questions do not require testimony about or 
impugn a legislative act. Thus our refusal to distinguish 
between Senator and aide in applying the Speech or De-
bate Clause does not mean that Rodberg is for all pur-
poses exempt from grand jury questioning. 
II 
\Ve are convinced also that the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly determined that Senator Gravel's alleged arrange-
ment with Beacon Press to publish the Pentagon Papers 
was not protected speech or debate within the meaning 
of Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution. 
1 :' It followH thnt nn nid<''s ('!aim of pri,·ilegc rnn be repudiated and 
thus waived by the Senator. 
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Historically the English legislative privilege was not 
viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise im-
mune libel on the floor of the House. Stockdale v. Han-
sard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 114, 112 K. B. 1112, 1156 (1839), 
recognized that "for speeches made in Parliament by a 
member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous 
to public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity." 
But it was clearly stated that "if the calumnious or 
inflamatory speeches should be reported and published, 
the law will attach responsibility on the publisher." 11 
This was accepted in Kilbourn v. Thompson as a "sound 
statement of the legal effect of the Bill of Rights and of 
the parliamentary law of England" and as a reasonable 
basis for inferring "that the framers of the Constitution 
meant the same thing by the use of language borrowed 
from that source." 103 U. S., at 202. 
Prior cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause 
"broadly to effectuate its purposes," United States v . 
.Johnson, 383 U. S., at 180, and have included within its 
reaeh anything "generally done in a session of the House 
by one of its members in relation to the business before 
14 StockdaLe extrn~ively reviewed the precedents and their inter-
play with the privilege so forcefully rrrognized in the Bill of Rights 
of 1689: "ThaL the freedom of speech, and de bat rs or proceedings 
in Parliament, ought not to he impeached or qurstioned in any court 
or place out of Parliament." 1 W. & M., SesR. 2, c. 2. From the~e 
rases, including Rex v. Creevy, 1 M. & S. 273, 105 Eng. Rep. 104 
(1813); Rex v. Wright, 8 T. H. 292, 101 K. B. 1396 (1799); Rex v. 
Abingdon, 1 ESP. 225, N. P. Cas. 337 (1795); Rex v. Williams, 2 
Show. K. B. 471, 89 Eng. Rep. 1048, it is apparent that to the 
extent English precedent i~ relevrnt to the Speech or Debate Clause 
there is little, if any, support for Sen:1lor Gravrl's po~ition with 
re~prct to republication. Parliament reactrd to Stockdale v. Ilansard 
by adopting the Parliamentary Paprrs Aet of 1840, 3 and 4 Viet., c. 9, 
which stayed proceedings in all cat~e::> where it could be shown that 
publication was br order of a House of Parliament and was a bona 
fide report, printed and circulated without malice. Sec generally 
C. Wittke, The History of English Parliamentary Privilege (1921). 
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it." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 204; Un-ited 
States v. Johnson, 383 U. S., at 170. Thus, voting by 
Members and committee reports are protected; and we 
recognize today--as the Court has recognized before, 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 204; Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 ( 1951)-that a Mem-
ber's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although 
subject to judicial review in various circumstances, as is 
legislation itself, may not be made the basis for a civil 
or criminal judgment against a Member because that 
conduct is within the "sphere of legitimate legislative· 
activity." !d., at 376.1" 
But the clause has not been extended beyond the legis-
lative sphere. That Senators generally perform certain 
acts in their official capacity as Senators does not neces-
sarily make all such acts legislative in nature. Members 
of Congress are constantly in touch with the Executive 
Branch of the Government and with administrative 
agencies-they may cajole, and exhort with respect to the 
administration of a federal statute-but such conduct, 
though generally done, is not protected legislative activity. 
United States v. Johnson decided at least this much. 
"No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be 
successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause 
reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to 
influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise 
1 ~ The Court in Tenney, 341 U. S., at 376-377, was equally clear 
that "legislative activity" i~ not all-encompa~sing, nor may its limits 
be e;;tablished by tlw Legislative Branch: "Lrgislaturcs may not of 
course acquire power by an unwarranted extension of' privilege. The 
House of Common's claim of power to establish the limits of its 
privilege has been lit lie more than a pretcn~e :;incc Ashby v. White, 
2 Ld. Raym. 938, 3 id., 20. This Court has not hesitated to sus-
tain the rights of private individuals when it found Congre~;; was 
acting outside its legislative role. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 
168; Marshall v. G01·don, 243 U. S. 521; compare McGrain v. 
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176." 
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related to the due functioning of the legislative process." 
383 U. S., at 172. Cf. Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 
444, 367-368 (1906). 
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart 
of the clause is speech or debate in either House, and in-
sofar as the clause is construed to reach other matters, 
they must be an integral part of the deliberative and 
communicative processes by which Members participate 
in committee and House proceedings with respect to the 
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legis-
lation or with respect to other matters which the Consti-
tution places within the jurisdiction of either House. As 
the Court of Appeals put it, the courts have extended 
the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate 
in either House, but "only when necessary to prevent in-
direct impairment of such deliberations." United States· 
v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753. 760 (CAl 1972). 
Here private publication by Senator Gravel through 
the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no ·way essen-
tial to the deliberations of the House; nor docs ques-
tioning as to private publication thrcate11 the integrity 
or indPpendence of the Hou c by impermissibly expos-
ing its deliberations to executive influence. The Senator· 
had conducted his hearings, tho record and any report 
that was forthcoming were available both to his com-
mittee and the House. Insofar as \\'C arc advised. neither 
Congress nor tho full committee ordered or authorized 
tho publication."; \Vc cannot but conclude that the I ~ 
'" Tho ~olr eon~titution:d rlaim :t~:'Prtrd hr rr j, ba,rd on the 
Sprr rh or Drb;tt r Clau~r. Wr ltrrcl not addrr,.:.• j,~ur" 1\'hic·h mty 
ari.•r 1\'hrn Cong;rc•s.' or rithrr IIou.•r, :1~ di,tinp;ui~'<hrd from :1 f' inp;lr 
~Tembrr. ordrr~ thr public;tlion and j or publil' di"tribution of f•om-
mittcc hraring;". report" or other matcri:tk Of rour.•r, Art. I , ~ 5, 
Cl. a. require:' thut each lTOU:'(' "kef'P a .)onrn:d of it~ Prol'eeding-•, 
nnd from limo to tirnr publish the f':tnw, c•xc·ppling- ~u<·h l':trf~ ns 
mny in thrir .Judl);mrnt require Sccrcf·y .... " Thi~ Cl::tn~<' h:t" not 
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Senator's arrangements with Beacon Press were not part 
and parcel of the legislative process. 
There are additional considerations. Article I, § 6, 
cl. 1, as '"e have emphasized, does not purport to confer 
a general exemption upon Members of Congress from 
liability or process in criminal cases. Quite the con-
tra.ry is true. While the Speech or Debate Clause rec-
ognizes speech, voting and other legislative acts as 
exempt from liability that might otherwise attach, it 
docs not privilege either Sena.tor or aide to violate an 
otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for or imple-
menting legislative acts. If republication of these clas-
sified papers "·as a crime under an Act of Congress, it 
\vas not entitled to immunity under the Speech or De-
bate Clause. It a.lso appears that the grand jury was 
pursuing this very subject in the normal course of a 
valid investigation. The Speech or Debate Clause does 
not in our view extend immunity to Rodberg, as a Sen-
ator's aide, from testifying before the grand jury about 
the arrangement bebyeen Senator Gravel and Beacon 
Press or about his own participation, if any, in the 
alleged transaction, . so long as legislative acts of the I 
Senator arc not impugned. 
III 
Similar considerations lead us to disagree with the 
Court of Appeals insofar as it fashioned, tentatively at 
least, a nonconstitutiona1 testimonial privilege protect-
ing Rodberg from any questioning by the grand jury 
concerning the matter of republication of the Pentagon 
Papers. This privilege, thought to be similar to that 
protecting executive officials from liability for libel, cf. 
bc•cn the subject of cxtcn~i,·c jndieinl cxmnin:li ion. Sec Field v. 
Clarl.-, 143 U. S. G-19, 570-671 (1802); United Statrs v. Ballin, 144 
U.S. 1, 4 (1892). 
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Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), was considered 
advisable "to the extent a congressman has responsibil-
ity to inform his constituents." But we cannot carry 
a judicially fashioned privilege so far as to immunize 
criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress or 
to frustrate the grand jury's inquiry into whether pub-
lication of these classified documents violated a fed-
eral criminal statute. The so-called executive privilege 
has never been applied to shield executive officers 
from prosecution for crime, the Court of Appeals "·as 
quite sure that third parties were neither immune 
from liability nor from testifying about the republica-
tion matter and we perceive no basis for conferring a 
testimonial privilege on Rodberg as the Court of Appeals 
seemed to do. 
IV 
We must finally consider, in the light of the fore-
going, whether the protective order entered by the Court 
of Appeals is an appropriate regulation of the pending 
grand jury proceedings. 
Focusing first on paragraph two of the order, we think 
the injunction against interrogating Rodbcrg with respect 
to any act, "in the broadest sense," performed by him 
within the scope of his employment, overly restricts 
the scope of grand jury inquiry. Rodberg's immunity, 
testimonial or otherwise, extends only to legislative acts 
as to which the Senator himself would be immune. The 
grand jury, therefore, if relevant to its investigation 
into the possible violations of the criminal law and 
absent Fifth Amendment objections, may require from 
Rodberg answers to questions relating to his or the 
Senator's arrangements, if any, with respect to repub-
lication or with respect to third party conduct under 
valid investigation by the grand jury, as long as the 
questions do not implicate legislative action of the Sen-
ator. Neither do we perceive any constitutional or other 
privilege that shields Rodberg, any more than any other 
" 
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witness, from grand jury questions relevant to tracing 
the source of obviously h.ighly classified documents that 
came into the Senator's possession and are the basic 
subject matter of inqu.iry in this case, as long as no } 
legislative act is implicated by the questions. 
Because the Speech or Debate Clause privilege ap-
plies both to Senator and aide, it appears to us that 
paragraph one of the order, alone, would afford ample· 
protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any 
witness, including Rod berg: ( 1) concerning the Sen-
ator's conduct, or the conduct of his aides, at the June 29, 
1971, meeting of the subcommittee; 17 (2) concerning 
the motives and purposes behind the Senator's conduct, 
or that of his aides, at that meeting; (3) concerning 
communications between the Senator and his aides dur-
ing the term of their employment and related to said 
meeting or any other leg~slative act of the Senator; 
( 4) except as it proves relevant to investigating possible 1 
third party crime, concerning any act, in itself not crim-
inal, performed by the Senator, or by his aides in the 
course of their employment, in preparation for the sub-
committee hearing. We leave the final form of such 
an order to the Court of Appeals in the first instance, or, 
if that court prefers, to the District Court. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated 
and the case is remanded to that court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
17 Ha.viiJg established that neither the Seuator nor Roclberg is 
subject to liability for what occurred at the subcommittee hearing, 
we perceive no bnsis for inquiry of either Roclberg or third parties 
on this subject. If it proves material to establish for the record the 
fact of publication at the subcommittee hearing, which seems un-
disputed, the public record of the henring would appear sufficient 
for this purpose. We do not intend to imply, however, that in no 
grand jury investigations or criminal trials of third parties may 
third-party witnesses be interrogated about legislative acts of Mem-
bers of Congress. 
7 
Rider A, p. 20, Gravel 6/13/72 
Neither do we perceive any constitutional or other privilege that 
shields Rodberg from grand jury questions relevant to determining 
whether a third party crime had been committed in obtaining the 
highly classified documents that are the basic subject matter of 
inquiry in this case, provided that no legislative act is implicated 
by the questions. 
-------- -------------
Rider 
( 4) . except where there is probable cause to believe a third 
party crime has been committed, [questions may be asked] 
concerning any act, 1n itself not criminal, performed by the 
Senator or by his aides 1n the course at their employment 1n 
preparation for the subcommittee hearing. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
""" Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
United States. 
United States, Petitioner, 
71- 1026 v. 
Mike Gravel, United States 
Senator. 
From: White, J. 
JUN 2 2 197a Recirculated: 
On Writs of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First 
Circuit. 
[June -, 19721 
MR. JusTICID \VHI'l'E delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
J 
These cases arise out of the investigation by a federal 
grand jury into possible criminal conduct with respect 
to the release and publication of a classified Defense 
Department study entitled "History of the United States 
l t 
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." This 
document, popularly known as the "Pentagon Papers," 
bore a Defense security classification of Top Secret- -/ 
Sensitive. The crimes being investigated included the ~ ~ • 
retention of public property or records with intent to 6 ... 
convert (18 U. S. C. § 641) , the gathering and trans- , '-~· 
mitting of nationa1 defense information (18 U. S. C. ~ 
§ 793), the concealment or removal of public records 
or documents (18 U. S. C. § 2071) , and conspiracy to 
commit such offenses and to defraud the United States h 
the witnesses subpoenaed ··ere Leonard S. t .J 
1 assi nt to Senator Mik Gravel of Alaska. ~ • ~ 
~~ . 1 lfJ. j t 
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and a resident fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies, 
and Ho>vard Webber, Director of M. I. T. Press. Sen-
ator Gravel, as intervenor/ filed motions to quash the 
subpoenas and to require the Government to specify 
the particular questions to be addressed to Rodberg." 
He asserted that requiring these " ·it11esse to appear and 
testify would violate his privilege under the Speech or 
Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, 
~ 6, Cl. 1. 
It appeared that on the night of June 29, 1971, Sen-
ator Gravel, as Chairma11 of the Subcommittee on Build-
ings and Grounds of the Senate Public \Yorks Commit-
tee, C'Onvened a meeting of the c::ubcommittee and there 
read extensively from a copy of the Pentagon Papers. 
1 The Distrirt Court p<'rmitted S<.'nntor Gravel to intervene in 
the pror<.'<.'ding on Dr. Rodlwrg's motion to quash the subporna 
ordering his appraranrc before the grand jury and accepted motion~ 
from Gravel to quash the subpoena and to sperif~· the exact natum 
of the questions to be nskrd Rodbcrg. Th<' Gov<'rnment contested' 
Gmnl's stnnding to nppral the trinl conrt'~ disposition of these 
motions on the ground that. h:1d the r-;ubpo<'n:l been dircrtrd to the 
Senator , he could 11ot hn,·r nppe;drcl from a d<'nial of n. motion to 
quash without fir~t rrfu~ing to comply with the subpoena and being 
hrld in rontempt. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971); 
('obbledick \'. United States, 309 U. S. 323 ( 1940). The Court of 
Appeals, United States v. Doe, 4.55 F. 2cl 753, 756-757 (CAl 1972), 
held thnt becanse thr subporna war-; dirrrtrd to third part irs, who· 
could not be counted on to ri~k rontrmpt to protect intervenor's 
rights, Gravel might he "poll"erlc~~ to anrt thr mischirf of the 
order" if not prrmittrcl to llPJWal. rit ing Perlman v. United Statl's,. 
247 U.S. 7. 1:3 (1918). The United State~ do<'~ not hrrr rhallrnge 
the propriety of the appeal. 
~Dr. Rodberg, who filed his own motion to f)ua sh th<' subpoem 
dirrctiug hi~ n]lpraranrr and tr:<timon~· , appP;trt•rl :t,; a111ir·1ts curiae 
both in the Court of Appral~ nnd thiH Court. Technically , Rodberg 
st:1tcs, he is u party to 71-1026, in~ofnr as the Gonrnmrnt uppcals 
from the protecti,·r order rntrred b~· th<' District Court. Howe,·er, 
::;inre Gravel intrrvencd, Rod berg doe,; not prrss the point. Brief 
of Leonard S. Rodberg as Amicus Cwiae 2, n. 2. 
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He then placed the entire 47 volumes of the study in 
the public record. Rodberg had been added to the 
Senator's staff earlier in the day and assisted Gravel 
in preparing for and conducting the hearing.'~ Some 
weeks later there >Yere press reports that Gravel had 
arranged for the papers to be published by Beacon 
Press 1 and that members of Gravel's staff had talked 
with Webber as editor of M. I. T. Press." 
The District Court overruled the motions to quash 
and to specify questions but entered an order proscrib-
ing certain categories of questions. United States v. 
Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (Mass. 1971). The Govern-
ment's contention that for purposes of applying the 
Speech or Debate Clause the courts were free to inquire 
into the regularity of the subcommittee meeting was 
rejected.() Because the Clause protected all legislative 
"The District Court found "th~t, 'as prrsonal n~sistnnt to movant 
fGraYell, Dr. Rodberg assisted in preparing for discloRure and sub-
Requently disclosing to mo1·nnt's collcngurs nne! constitutrnts, at a 
hearing of the Senntc Subcommittee on Public Buildings ~nd Grounds, 
the contents of the so-cnllecl "Pentagon Pnpers," which were critical 
of the Executive'~ conduct in the field of foreign rrl11tions.'" United 
Sta.tes v. Dne, 332 F. 8upp. 930, 932 (M~ss. 1971) . 
• Brncon Press is n cliYision of thr Unit:ninn Univerf'alist Associa-
tion, which appenred here as arnicus curiae in support of the position 
taken by Senator Gravel. 
5 Gravel so alleged in his motion to intervrne in the Webbrr 
matter and to quash 1 hr subpoena ordering Wcbbrr to appear and 
testify. App. 15-18. 
G The Govrrnmrnt mnint:1ined th:1t Congress docs not enjoy un-
limited power to conduct busineRs :1ncl that judicial revirw has often 
been exercised to curb cxtrn-legi~l:1tive incursions by legislative com-
mittees, citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957); 
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927); IIentofJ v. !chord, 
318 F. Supp. 1175 (C'ADC 1970), :1t lc:1st whrre Buch incursions arc-
unrelated to a legitimate legislative purpo~f'. It was allrged that 
Gravel hnd "rom·enrd a sprcial, unauthorized nnd untimely meeting 
of the Sen:1te Subcommittre on Public Works (at midnight on 
June 29, 1971), for the purpose of rending t.he documents and there-
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acts, it was held to shield from inquiry anything the 
Senator did at the subcommittee meeting and "certain 
acts done in preparation therefor." I d., at 935. The 
Senator's privilege also prohibited "inquiry into things 
done by Rodberg as the Senator's aide or assistant which 
would have been legislative acts, and therefore priv-
ileged, if performed by the Senator personally." !d., 
at 937-938. 7 The trial court, however, held the private 
republication of the documents was not privileged by 
the Speech or Debate Clause.8 
after placed all unread portions in the subcommittee record, with 
Dr. Rodberg soliciting publication af1er thr meeting'' App. 9. Tlie 
District Court rejected the contention: "Senator Grnvel has sug-
gested that the availability of funds for the construction and im-
provement of public buildings and grounds hns bern nffccted by the 
necessary costs of the war in Vietnam and that therefore the de-
vrlopment and conduct of the war is properly within the concern 
of the subrommittee. The court rejects the Government's argu-
ment without detailed consideration of the merits of the Senator's 
po ition, on the basis of the general rule restricting inquiry into 
matters of legislative purpose and operations." United States v. 
Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 9:35 (Mnss. 1971). Cases such as Watkins, 
supra, were distingui~hed on the ground that they concerned the 
power of Congress under the Constitution: "It has not been sug-
gested by the government that the subcommittee itself is unauthor-
ized, nor that the war in Vietnam is an issue beyond the purview of 
congressional debate and action. Also, the individual rights at 
stake in these proceedings arc not those of a witness before a con-
~rrssional committee or of a subject of a committee's investigation, 
but only those of a congressman ::mel member of his personal staff 
who claim 'intimidation by the executive.'" I d., at 736. 
7 The District Court thought that Roclbcrg could be questioned 
concerning his own conduct prior to joining the Senator's staff and 
concerning the activities of third parties with whom Roclbcrg and 
Gravel dealt. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 934 (Mass. 
1971). 
8 The protective order entered by the District Court provided as 
follows: 
"(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating the 
release of the Pentagon Papers may be questioned about Senator 
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the mo-
tions to quash but modified the protective order to 
reflect its own views of the scope of the congressional 
privilege. United States Y. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753 (CAl 
1972). Agreeing that Senator and aide were one for 
the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause and that 
the Clause foreclosed inquiry of both Senator and aide 
with respect to legislative acts, the Court of Appeals 
also viewed the privilege as barnn direct in uir "-'Of 
the en a tor or us a1 e, u not o t 11r parties, ~ 
the sources of the Senator's information used in per-
formin g legislative dutics.0 Although it did not con-
sider private republication by the Senator or Beacon 
Press to be protected by the Constitution, the Court 
of Appeals apparently held that neither Senator nor aide-
could be questioned about it because of a common law 
privilege akin to the judicially created immunity of ex-
ecutive officers from liability for libel contained in a 
news release issued in the course of their normal duties. 
See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959). This priv-
ilege, fashioned by the Court of Appeals, would not 
Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public 
Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor about things done by 
the Senator in preparation for and intimately related to said meeting. 
"(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own 
actions on June 29, 1971, after having been engaged as a member 
of Senator Gravel'~ personal staff to the extent that they were clone 
at the Senator's direction either at a meeting of the Subcommittee 
on Public Buildings and Grounds or in preparation for and inti-
mately related to sa id meeting." 
9 The Court of Appeals thought third parties could be questioned 
as to their own conduct regarding the Pentagon Papers, "includ-
ing their dealings with intervenors or his aides." United States v. 
Doe. 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl Hl72). Thr court found no mNit 
in the claim that such parties should be shielded from questioning 
under the Speech or Debate Clause concerning their own wrongful 
acts, even if such questioning may bring the Senator's conduct into . 
question. Id., at 758, n. 2. 
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protect third parties from similar inquiries before the 
grand jury. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the 
protective order to be observed by prosecution and grand 
.JUry was: 
"(1) No witness before the grand jury currently 
investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers 
may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's 
conduct at a meeting of the Subcommit.tee on Pub-
lic Buildings a.nd Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor, 
if the questions are directed to the motives or pur-
poses behind the Senator's conduct at that meet-
ing, about any communications with him or with 
his aides regarding the activities of the Senator 
or his aides during the period of their employment, 
in preparation for and related to said meeting. 
"(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be ques-
tioned about his own actions in the broadest sense, 
including observations and communications, oral or 
written, by or to him, or coming to his attention 
while being interviewed for, or after having been 
engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal 
staff to the extent that they were in the course 
of his employ_n~nt." 
~ .--
The United States petitioned for certiorari challeng-
ing the ruling that aides and other persons may not 
be questioned with respect to legislative acts and that 
an aide to a Member of Congress has a common-law 
privilege not to testify before a grand jury with respect 
to private republication of materials introduced into 
a subcommittee record. Senator Gravel also petitioned 
for certiorari seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals 
insofar as it held private republication unprotected by 
the Speech or Debate Clause and asserting that the pro-
tective order of the Court of Appeals too narrowly 
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protected against inquiries that a grand jury could direct 
to third parties. We granted both petitions. 405 U. S. 
916 (1972). 
I 
Because the claim is that a Member's aide shares 
the Member's constitutional privilege, we consider first 
whether and to "·hat extent Senator Gra l is 
exempt from process or mquiry y a grand jurYii1'Vesti-
gating the commission of a crime. Our frame of refer-
ence is Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution: 
"The Senators and Representatives shall receive 
a Compensation for their Services. to be ascertained 
by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United 
States. They shall in all Cases. except Treason, 
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from 
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of 
their respective Houses, and in going to and re-
turning from the same; and for any Speech or De-
bate in either House, they shall not be questioned 
in any other Place." 
The last sentence of the clause provides Members of 
Congress with two distinct privileges. Except in cases 
of "Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace," the clause 
shields Members from arrest while attending or traveling 
to and from a session of their House. History reveals, 
and prior cases so hold, that this 11art of the clause 
exempts Members from arrest in civil cases only. 
"When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil 
suits were common in America. It is only to such ar-
rests that the provision applies." Long v. Ansell, 293 
U. S. 76, 83 (1934) (footnote omitted). "Since ... 
the terms treason, felony and breach of the peace, as 
used in the constitutional provision relied upon, ex-
cepts from the operation of privilege all criminal offenses, 
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the conclusion results that the claim of privilege of 
exemption from arrest and sentence was without 
merit .... " Will-iamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 
425, 446 (1908).10 Nor does freedom from arrest con-
fer immunity on a Member from service of process as 
a defendant in civil matters, Long v. Ansell, supra, at 
82-83, or as a witness in a criminal case. "The Con-
stitution gives to every man, charged with an offense,. 
the benefit of compulsory process, to secure the attend-
ance of his witnesses. I do not know of any privilege 
to exempt members of Congress from the service, or 
the obligations, of a subpoena, in such cases." United 
States v. Cooper, 4 Dall. 340, 341 (1800) (11er Chase, J., 
sitting on Circuit). It is, therefore, sufficiently plain l 
that the constitutional freedom from arrest does not ex-
em t Members of Conaress from the o eration of the 
ordmary crumna aws, even t1ough impnsonment may 
prevent or interfere with the performance of their duties 
as Members. Williamson v. United States, supra; cf. 
Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344 (1906). In-
deed, implicit in the narrow scope of the privilege of 
freedom from arrest is, as Jefferson noted, the judgment 
that le islators ought not to stand above the law they 
create genera y o e oun y 1t as are 
ordinary persons. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary 
Practice, S. Doc. No. 91-2 437 (1971). 
In recognition, no doubt, of the force of this part of 
Clause 6, Senator Gravel disavows any assertion of gen-
10 Williamson, United States Congressman, had been found guilty 
of conspiring to c01mnit subornation of perjury in connection with 
proceedings for the purchase of public land. He objected to the 
court passing sentence upon him and particularly protrsted that any 
imprisomnent would deprive him of his constitutional right to "go 
to, attend at and return from the ensuing session of Congress." 
Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 432-433 (1908). The 
Court rejected the contention that the Speech or Debate Clause freed 
legislators from accountability for criminal conduct. 
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eral immunity from the criminal law. But he points 
out that the last portion of Clause 6 affords Members 
of Congress another vital privilege-they may not be J 
questioned in any other place for any speech or debate 
in either House. The claim is not that while one part 
of Clause 6 generally permits prosecutions for treason, 
felony and breach of the peace, another part neverthe-
less broadly forbids them. Rather, his insistence is -that the Speech or Debate Clause at the ver least ro-
tec s mn rom cnmma or c1v1 1a 1 1 y an from 2 ues-· 
t ioni'i'1g elsewhe'retiian in the Sen:ie, ":,ith respect to 
t~ents occurrin at the subcommittee hear·ng at 
apers were introduced into the 
public record. this claim is incontrovertible. 
The Speech or Debate Clause was es1gne o assure a 
coequal branch of the government wide freedom of 
speech, debate and deliberation without intimidation or 
threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects 
I Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process. We have no doubt that Senator {}ravel m&v not be made to_;:tn- \ 
swer-either in terms of questions or m terms ofde: 
reiW.ing himself from prosecution-f~r the eve1;,ts th#tt 
occurred at the subcommi tee meetmg. Our decisJOn 
is ma e easier oy t e act t at the United States ap-
pears to have abandoned whatever position it took to· 
the contrary in the lower courts. 
Even so, the United States strongly urges that be-
cause the Speech or Debate Clause confers a privilege 
only upon "Senators and Representatives," Rodberg 
himself has no valid claim to constitutional immunity 
from grand jury inquiry. In our view, both courts 
below correctly rejected this position. We agree with 
the Court of Appeals that for the purpose of construing 
the privilege a Member and his aide are to be "treated 
as one," United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl 
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1972); or, as the District Court put it: The "Speech or 
Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into things done by 
Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant which 
would have been legislative acts, and therefore priv-
ileged, if performed by the Senator personally." United 
States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 937- 938 (Mass. 1971). 
Both courts recognized what the Senate of the United 
States urgently presses here: that it is literally impos-
sible, in view of the complexities of the modern legis-
lative process, with Congress almost constantly in ses-
sion and matters of legislative concern constantly pro-
liferating, for Members of Congress to perform their· 
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; 
that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to 
the Members' performance that they must be treated 
as the latters' alter ego; and that if they are not so 
recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate 
Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by tlw 
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile 
judiciary, United States Y. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 181-
\\'ill inevitably be diminished and frustrated. 
The Court has already embraced similar views in BarT 
Y. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) , " ·here in immunizing the-
Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization from 
liability for an alleged libel contained in a press release, 
the Court held that the executive privilege recognized in 
prior cases could not be restricted to those of cabinet 
rank. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, "the privilege 
is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an 
expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective 
functioning of Government. The complexities and mag-
nitude of governmental activity have become so great 
that there must be a delegation and redelegation, and 
we cannot say that these functions become less im-
portant simply because they are exercised by officers of 
lower rank in the executive hierarchy." I d., at 572- 573. 
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It is true that the clause itself mentions only "Sena-
tors and Representatives," but prior cases have plainly 
not taken a literalistic apr>roach in applying the priv-
ilege. The clause also speaks only of "Speech or D<'-
bate," but the Court's consistent approach has bern that 
to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause 
to words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably 
narrow view. Committee reports, resolutions, and the 
act of voting arc equally covered; "[i] n short, ... 
things generally done in a session of the House by one 
of its members in relation to the business before it." 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 204 (1880). quoted 
with approval in United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 
169, 179 (1966). Rather than giving the clause a cramped 
construction, the Court has sought to implement its 
fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from exec-
utive and judicial oversight that realistically threaten 
to control his conduct as a legislator. We have little 
doubt that \Ve are neither exceeding our judicial powers 
nor mista.kenly construing the Constitution by holding ' 
that the Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a 
Member but also to his aide';'"insofar ; s the conduct of 
~ -the latter would be a. protected lc isla · act if per-
forme y 1e em er nnse . 
Nor can " ·e agree with the Ullitcd States that our 
conclusion is foreclosed by Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, 
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 ( 1967), and Pow-
ell Y. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969), where the 
speech or debate privilege was held unavailable to cer-
tain House and committee employees. Those casrs do 
not hold that persons other than Members of Congress 
arc beyond the protection of the clause when they per-
form or aiel in the performance of legislative acts. In 
Kilbourn, the Speech or Debate Clause protected House 
Members who had adopted a resolution authorizing 
Kilbourn's arrest; that act was clearly legislative in na-
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ture. But the resolution was subject to judicial review 
insofar as its execution impinged on a citizen's rights as 
it did there. That the House could with impunity order 
an unconstitutional arrest afforded no protection for 
those who made the arrest. The Court quoted with ap-
proval from Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 112 K. B. 
1112 (1839): "So if the Speaker by authority of the 
House order an illegal act, though that authority shall 
exempt him from question, his order shall no more 
justify the person who executed it than King Charles' 
warrant for levying ship-money could justify his reve-
nue officer." 103 U. S., at 102.11 The Speech or Debate 
Clause could not be construed to immunize an illegal 
arrest even though directed by an immune legislative 
act. The Court was careful to point out that the 
Members themselves were not implicated in the actual 
arrest, id., at 200, and, significantly enough, reserved the 
question whether there might be circumstances in which 
"there may ... be things done, in the one House or 
the other, of an extraordinary character, for >vhich the 
members who take part in the act may be held legally 
responsible." 103 U. S., at 204 (emphasis added). 
Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra, is little different in 
principle. The Speech or Debate Clause there protected 
11 In Kilbourn, 103 U. S., at 198, the Court noted a second ex-
ample, used by Mr. Justice Colrridgr in Stockdale, 9 Ad. & E., at 
225-226, 112 K. B., at 1196-1197: "'Let me suppose, by way of 
illu -tration, an extrrme case; the House of Cmmnons resolves that 
any one wearing a drc~s of a particular manufacture is guilty of a 
breach of privilege, and orders the arrest of such persons by the 
constable of the pari~h. An arrest i ~ made and action brought, to 
which the order of the Housr is pleaded as a justification. . . . In 
such a rase as the one supposed, the plaintiff's counsel would insist 
on the distinction between power and privilege; and no lawyer can 
seriously doubt that it exists: but the argument confounds them, and 
forbids us to enquire, in any particuhr case, whether it ranges 
under the one or the other. I can find no principle which sanc-
tions this.'" 
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a Senator, who was also a subcommittee chairman, but 
not the subcommittee counsel. The record contained no 
evidence of the Senator's involvement in any activity that 
could result in liability, 387 U. S., at 84, whereas the 
committee counsel was charged with conspiring with 
state officials to carry out an illegal seizure of records 
which the committee sought for its own proceedings. 
Ibid. The committee counsel was deemed protected to 
some extent by legislative privilege, but it did not shield 
him from answering as yet unproved charges of conspir-
ing to violate the constitutional rights of private parties. 
Unlawful conduct of this kind the Speech or Debate 
Clause simply did not immunize. 
Powell v. McCormick reasserted judicial power to de-
termine the validity of legislative actions impinging on 
individual rights-there the illegal exclusion of a repre-
sentative-elect-and to afford relief against House aides 
seeking to implement the invalid resolutions. The Mem-
bers themselves were dismissed from the case because 
shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause both from lia-
bility for their illegal legislative act and from having to 
defend themselves with respect to it. As in Kilbourn, 
the Court did not reach the question "whether under the 
Speech or Debate Clause petitioners would be entitled to 
maintain this action solely against the members of Con-
gress where no agent participated in the challenged action 
and no other remedy was available." 395 U. S., at 506 
n. 26. 
fleet a deci e y Jaundiced view towards extending the 
clause so as to privilege illegal or unconstitutional con-
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duct beyond that essential to foreclose executive control 
of legislative speech or debate and associated matters such 
as voting and committee reports and proceedings. In 
Kilbourn, the Sergeant-at-Arms "'·as executing a legisla-
tive order, the issuance of which fell within the Speech or 
Debate Clause; in Eastland, the committee counsel was 
gathering information for a hearing; and in Powell, the 
Clerk and Doorkeeper were merely carrying out directions 
that were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. In 
each case, protecting the rights of others may have to 
some extent frustrated a planned or completed legislative 
act; but relief could be aft'orded without proof of a legis-
lative act or the motives or purposes underlying such an 
act. No threat to legislative independence was posed, 
and Speech or Debate Clause protection did not attach. 
None of this, as we see it, involves distinguishing be-
tween a Senator and his personal aides with respect to 
legislative immunity. In Kilbourn-type situations, both 
aide and Member should be immune with respect to com-
mittee and House action leading to the illegal resolution. 
So too in Eastland, as in this case, senatorial aides should 
enjoy immunity for helping a Member conduct committee 
hearings. On the other hand, no prior ase has h 
th~ Members of_ Cono-ress would e immune if th¥Y 
execute an mva!idresoThtwn by themselves carrl ing out 
an iltegal arrest, or 1t, m•order to secure information for 
a h;ah ng, iEem,..sO!ves seize the property or invade t~e­
privacy of a citizen. Neither ihey nor their aides should 
beimmun e h oJ\1 liability or questioning in such circum-
stances. Such acts arc no more essential to legislating· 
than the conduct held unprotected in United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).'~ 
12 Senator Gravel is willing to assume that if he personally had 
"stolen" the Pentagon Papers , and that act wrre a nimc, he could 
be prosecuted, as could aides or other assistant" who participated 
in the theft. Consolidated Brief of Senator Gravel 93. 
• 
eN-tttt ... : .p 
~~~ 
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The United States fears the abuses that history re-
veals have occurred when legislators are invested with 
the power to relieve others from the operation of other-
wise valid civil and criminal la,vs. But these abuses, it 
seems to us, are for the most part obviated if the privilege 
applicable to the aide is vicwf'd, as it must be, as the 
privilege of the Senator, and invocable only by the Sen-
ator or by tho aide on the Senator's behalf,"' and if in all 
events the privilege available to tho aide is confined to 
those serviGes that "·ould be immune legislative conduct 
if performed by the Senator himself. This view places 
beyond tho Speech or Debate Clause a variety of services 
characteristically performed by aides for Members of 
Congress, even though within tho scope of their employ-
ment. It likewise provides no protection for criminal 
conduct threatening the security of the person or property 
of others. whether performed at the direction of the 
Senator in preparation for or in execution of a legislative 
act or done \Yithout_._hi 1-nowledge or direction. 01 er 
does it immunize Senator or aide from testi ymg at trials 
or grand jury proceedings involving third-party crimes 
where the questions do not require testimony about or 
impugn a legislative act. Thus our refusal to distinguish 
between Senator and aide in applying the Speech or De-
bate Clause does not mean that Rodberg is for all pur-
poses exempt from grand jury questioning. 
We are convinced also that the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly determined that Senator Gravel's alleged arrange-
ment with Beacon Press to publish ·the Pentagon Papers 
was not protected speech or debate within the meaning 
of Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution. 
13 It follows that an aide's claim of pri,·ilcge can be repudiated and 
thus waived by the Senator. 
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Historically the English legislative privilege was not 
viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise im-
mune libel on the floor of the House. Stockdale v. Han-
sard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 114, 112 K. B. 1112, 1156 (1839), 
recognized that "for speeches made in Parliament by a 
member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous 
to public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity." 
But it was clearly stated that "if the calumnious or 
inflamatory speeches should be reported and published, 
the law will attach responsibility on the publisher." 14 
14 Stockdale extenRively reviewed the precedents and their inter-
play with the privilege so forcefully recognized in the Bill of Rights 
of 1689: "That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings 
in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court 
or place out of Parliament." 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2. From thesc 
cases, including Re.x v. Creevy, 1 M. & S. 273, 105 Eng. Rep. 104 
(1813); Rex v. Wright, 8 T. R. 292, 101 K. B. 1396 (1799); Rex v. 
Abingdon, 1 ESP. 225, N. P. Cas. 337 (1795); Rex v. Williams, 2 
Show. K. B. 471, 89 Eng. Rep. 1048, it is apparent that to the 
extent English precedent is relevent to the Speech or Dcbn,le Clause 
there is little, if any, support for Senator Gravel's position with 
respect to republication. Parliament reacted to Stockdale v. Hansard 
by adopting the Parliamentary Papers Act of 1840, 3 and4 Viet., c. 9, 
which stayed proceedings in all cases where it could be shown .that 
publication was by order of a House of Parliament and was a bona 
fide report, printed and circulated without malice. See generally 
C. Wittke, The History of English Parliamentary Privilege (1921). 
Gravel urges that Stockdale v. Hansard was later rcpndi11ted in 
Wason v. Walt er, 4 Q. B. 73 (1868), which held a proprietor im-
mune from civil libel for an accurate republication of a debate in 
the House of Lords. But the immunity established in Wason was 
not founded in parliamentary privilege, id., at 84, but upon analogy 
to the privilege for reporting judicial proceedings. I d., at 87-90. 
The Wason court stated its "unhesitating and unqualified adhesion" 
to the "masterly judgments" rendered in Stockdale and rhnracterized 
the question before it as whether republication, quite apart from 
any assertion of parliamentary privilege, was "in itself privileged 
and lawful." Id., at 86-87. That the privileges for nonmalicious 
republication of parliamentary and judicial proceedings-later estab-
lished as qualificcl-\vere construed as coextensive in all respects, id., 
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This was accepted in Kilbourn v. Thompson as a "sound 
statement of the legal effect of the Bill of Rights and of 
the parliamentary law of England" and as a reasonable· 
basis for inferring "that the framers of the Constitution 
meant the same thing by the use of language borrowed 
from that source." 103 U. S., at 202. 
Prior cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause-
"broadly to effectuate its purposes," United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U. S., at 180, and have included within its 
reach anything "generally done in a session of the House· 
by one of its members in relation to the business before 
it." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 204; United 
States v. Johnson, 383 U. S., at 179. Thus, voting by 
Members and committee reports are protected; and we· 
recognize today-as the Court has recognized before, 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 204; Tenney v .. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-378 (1951)-that a Mem-
ber's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although 
subject to judicial review in various circumstances, as is 
legislation itself, may not be made the basis for a civil 
or criminal judgment against a Member because that 
conduct is within the "sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity." !d., at 376.1 5 
at 95, further underscores the inappositeness of reading Wason as 
based upon parliamentary privilege, which like the Speech or Debate· 
Clause is absolute. Much later Holdsworth was to comment that 
at the time of Was on the distinction between absolute and qualified 
privilege had not been worked out and that the "part played by 
malice in the tort and crime of defamation" probably helped retard 
recognition of a qualified privilege. 8 Holdsworth's History of 
English Common Law 377 (1926). 
15 The Court in Tenney, 341 U. S., at 376-377, was equally clear 
that "legislative activity" is not all-encompassing, nor may its limits 
be established by the Legislative Branch: "Legislatures may not of 
course acquire power by an unwarranted el\1:ension of privilege. The 
House of Common's claim of power to establish the limits of its 
privilege has been liLtle more than a pretense since Ashby v. White, .. 
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But the clause has not been extended beyond the legis-
lative sphere. That Senators generally perform certain 
acts in their official capacity as Senators does not neces-
sarily make all such acts legislative in nature. Members 
of Congress are constantly in touch with the Executive 
Branch of the Government and ·with administrative 
agencies-they may cajole, and exhort with respect to the 
administration of a federal statute-but such conduct, 
though generally done, is not protected legislative activity. 
United States v. Johnson decided at least this much. 
"No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be 
successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause 
reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to 
influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise 
related to the clue functioning of the legislative process." 
383 U. S., at 172. Cf. Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 
444, 367-368 (1906). 
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart 
of the clause is speech or debate in either House, and in-
sofar a the clause is construed to reach other matters, 
they must be an integral part of the deliberative and 
communicative processes by which Members participate 
in committee and House proceedings with respect to the 
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legis-
lation or with respect to other matters which the Consti-
tution 11laces within the jurisdiction of either House. As 
the Court of Appeals put it, the courts have extended 
the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate 
in either House, but "only when necessary to prevent in-
direct impairment of such deliberations." United States 
v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753. 760 (CAl 1972). 
2 Ld. Raym. 938. 3 id., 20. This Court haH not he.,;itated to sus-
tain the rights of pri,·ate indi,·idual~ when it found Congre.,~ mtH 
acting outside its lrgi>'lati,·c role. Kilbourn v. Thom]Json, 103 U. S. 
158; Marshall v. Gordon, 24:3 U. S. 521; compnre McGrain v. 
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 17G." 
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Here private publication by Senator Gravel through l 
the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way essen-
tial to the deliberations of the House; nor does ques-
tioning as to private publication threaten the integrity 
or independence of the House by imper111issibly expos-
ing its deliberations to executive influence. The Senator 
had conducted his hearings, the record and any report 
that was forthcoming were available both to his com-
mittee and the House. Insofar as we are advised, neither 
Congress nor the full committee ordered or authorized 
the publication.' a We cannot but conclude that the 
Senator's arrangements with Beacon Press were not part 
and parcel of the legislative process. 
There are additional considerations. Article I, § 6, 
cl. 1, as we have emphasized, does not purport to confer 
a general exemption upon ]\{embers of Congress from 
liability or process in criminRl cases. Quite the con-
trary is true. While the Speech or Debate Clause rec-
ognizes speech, voting and other legislative acts as 
exempt from liability that might otherwise attach, it 
docs not privilege either Senator or aide to violate an 
otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for or im11le-
menting legislative acts. If republication of these clas-
sified papers was a crime under an Act of Congress, it 
was not entitled to immunity under the Speech or De-
bate Clause. It also appears that the grand jury was 
, n The sole constit-utional claim a~;;erf ed hrrr i ~ ba8rd on t he 
Speech or DPbnto Clausr. vVe need not adclrr""' i ;;sn r~ which may 
n ri~e when Congress or eit her Hou~r , m; cli~tinguislwcl from a ~iugle 
?l'frmber , order~ th e publication nnd j or publi c di~tribution of rom-
mi ttre hearing~ . report s or other matr ri .1ls. Of couJ-.~e, Art. I , § 5, 
C l. 3. requires thnt each House "keep n .Journ:t! of it ~ Proreeding~, 
nn e! from t ime t o time pnbli~h t he same, rxl' <:pting such Pr1rts as 
ma:v in t heir Judgment require Secrecy .. .. " This Clausr ha ~ no t 
lJC'Pil t he ,;ubjPrl of extPnsive judieial examin niion. Sec Field v. 
Clark, 14:1 U. S. 6-19 , 670- 071 (1892) ; United States v. Ballin, 144 
U.S. 1, 4 (1892) . 
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11ursuing this very subject in the normal course of a 
valid investigation. The Speech or Debate Clause does 
not in our view extend immunity to Rodberg, as a Sen-
ator's aide, from testifying before the grand jury about 
the arrangement between Senator Gravel and Beacon 
Press or about his own participation, if any, in the 
alleged transactioll, so long as legislative acts of the 
Senator are not impugned. 
III 
Similar considerations lead us to disagree with the 
Court of Appeals insofar as it fashioned, tentatively at 
least, a nonconst!,tutional testimonial privilw e protect-
ing Rodberg from any quesb omng by the grand jury 
concerning the matter of republication of the Pentagon 
Papers. This privilege, thought to be similar to that 
protecting executive officials from liability for libel, cf. 
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), was considered 
advisable "to the extent a congressman has responsibil-
ity to inform his constituents." But \Ve cannot carry 
a judicially fashioned privilege so far as to immunize 
criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress or 
to frustrate the grand jury's inquiry into whether pub-
lication of these classified documents violated a fed-
! 
eral criminal statute. The so-called executive privilege 
has never been applied to shield executive office-rs 
from prosecution for crime, the Court of Appeals " ·as 
quite sure that third parties were neither immune 
from liability nor from testifying about the republica-
tion matter and we perceive no basis for conferring a 
testimonial privilege on Rodberg as the Court of Appeals 
seemed to do. 
IV 
We must finally consider, in the light of the fore-
going, whether the protective order entered by the Court 
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of Appeals is an appropriate regulation of the pending· 
grand jury proceedings. 
Focusing first on paragraph two of the order, we think 
the injunction against interrogating Rodberg with respect 
to any act, "in the broadest sense," performed by him 
within the scope of his employment, overly restricts 
the scope of grand jury inquiry. Rodberg's immunity, 
testimonial or otherwise, extends only to legislative acts, 
as to 'X.ltich the Senator himself would be immune. The 
grand jury, therefore, if rele\'ant-t'6 1 s mvest1gation 
into the possible violations of the criminal law and 1 
absent Fifth Amendment objections, may require from 
Rodberg answers to questions relating to his or the· 
Senator's arrangements, if any, with respect to repub-
lication or with respect to third party conduct under ) 
valid investigation by the grand jury, as long as the· 
questions do not implicate legislative action of the Sen-
ator. Neither ow erceive a1'1Y cnn~t·itutiofiaiOr other 
pr~le"li< t~§hiel fL,RoQbrg, any more t 1an any o 1er 
witness, from r nd jury questions relevant to tracing 
the source o o 
. • e enator § ~~x~swn anc are t c asic 
subj~t ma'tfer of t 1quiry in th't; case, as long as no 
legislative act is im icat d by the uestions. 
ecause t 1e Speech or Debate ause pnvilege ap-
plies both to Senator and aide, it appears to us that 
paragraph one of the order, alone, would afford ample 
protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any 
witness, including Rodberg: (1) concerning the Sen-
ator's conduct, or the conduct, of his aides, at the June 29, 
1971, meeting of the subcommittee; 1 7 (2) concerning 
17 Ihving established that neither the Senntor nor Tiodberg i ~ 
subject to liability for what occurred at the subcommittee hearing, 
we perceive no basis for inquiry of either Rodberg or third parties 
on this subject. If it proves material to establish for the record the · 
r' 
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the motives and purposes behind the Senator's conduct, 
or that of his aides, at that meeting; (3) concerning 
communications between the Senator and his aides dur-
ing the term of their employment and related to said 
meeting or any other legislative act of the Senat:~ 
'*("4) except as 1t proves re:levantto investigating possible 
third party crime, concerning any act, in itself not crim-
inal, performed by the Senator, or by his aides in the 
course of their cmplo ment · rati n 
comm· arin e leave the final form of such 
an order to the Court of Appeals in the first instance, or, 
if that court prefers, to the District Court. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated 
and the case is remanded to that court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
fact of publication the subcommittee he:trin~. whirh seems un-
disputed, the public r cord of the hearing would appear sufficirnt 
for this purpose. We not intend to imply, howrver, that in no 
grand jury im·cstig:ttions or criminal trials of third parties may 
third-party witne ses be int rogated about legislatiYe acts of Me 
hers of Con~res;;;. As for it nuiry of Rodbrrg about thi pnrly 
1 JS~i~5'~ · . ' lhe Di~1rirt Court has c grand jury prorerdings within proper bmmdR :mel to 
forrclose improvident h:ua~~ment and fi~hing expeditions into the 
nffair~ of a Member of Congre~s th:t t are no proper concern of thc-
gt·and jury. l. 
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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
United States Court of Ap-




The facts of this case, which are detailed by the Court, and the 
objections to over-classification of documents by the Executive, detailed 
by my Brother Douglas, need not be repeated here. My concern is with 
the narrow scope accorded the Speech and Debate Clause by Today's 
decision. I fully agree with the Court that a Congressman9s immunity 
under the Clause must be extended to his aides if it is to be at all effective. 
The complexities and press of Congressional business make it impossible 
for a member to function without the close cooperation of his legislative 
assistants. Their role as his agents in the performance of official duties 
requires that they share his immunity for those acts. The scope of that 
immunity, however, is as important as the per sons to whom it extends. 
In my view today's decision so restricts the privilEge of Speech or Debate 
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as to endanger the continued performane of legislative tasks that are vital 
to the workings of our democratic system. 
I. 
In holding that Senator Gravel's alleged arrangement with Beacon 
Press to publish the Pentagon Papers is not shielded from extra-Senatorial 
inquiry by the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court adopts what for me is a 
far too narrow view of the legislative function. The Court seems to assume 
that words spoken in debate or written in congressional reports are protected 
by the Clause, so that if Senator Gravel had recited part of the Pentagon 
Papers on the Senate floor or copied them into a Senate report, those acts 
could nd: be questioned "in any other place." Yet because he sought a wider 
audience, to publicize information deemed relevant to matters pending before 
his own committee, the Senator suddenly loses his immunity and is exposed 
to grand jury investigation and possible prosecution for the publication. The 
explanation for this anomolous results is the Court's belief that "Speech or 
Debate" encompasses only acts necessary to the internal deliberations of 
Congress concerning proposed legislation. "Here," according to the Court, 
"private publication by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon Press 
was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Housep" Ante at 18. 
Therefore, "the Senatorv's arrangements with Beacon Press were not part 
and parcel of the legislative process." Ibid. 
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Thus the Court excludes from the sphere of protected legislative 
activity a function that I had supposed lay at the heart of our democratic 
system. I speak, of course, of the legislator's duty to inform the public 
about matters affecting the administration of government. That this 
"informing function" falls into the class of things "generally done in a 
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business 
before it," Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880) was explicitly 
acknowledged by the Court in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
e 
In speaking of the '1power of Congress to inqui:Jlinto and publicize corruption, 
maladministration or inefficiency in the agencies of Government, " the Court 
noted that "From the earliest times in its history, Congress has assiduously 
performed an vinforming function' of this nature. " Id., at 200, n. 33. 
We need look no further than Congress itself to find evidence support-
ing the Court9s observation in Watkins. Congress has provided:fi.nancial 
support for communications between its members and the public, including 
the franking privilege for letters, telephone and telegraph allowances, 
stationery allotments, and favorable prices on reprints from the Congressional 
Record. Congressional hearings, moreover, are not confined to gathering 
information for- internal distribution, but are often widely publicized, some-
times televised, as a means of alerting the electorate to matters of public 
import and concern. The list is virtually endless, but a small sampling of 
contemporaneous hearings cf this kind would certainly include the Kefauver 
hearings on organized crime, the 1966 hearings on automobile safety, and 
.. 
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the numerous hearings of the Senate Foregin Relations Committee on the 
origins and conduct of the War in Vietnam. In short, there can be little 
doubt that informing the electorate is a thing "generally done" by the 
members of Congress "in relation to the business before it." 
The informing function has been cited by numerous students of 
American politics, both within and without the Government, as among the 
most important responsibilities of legislative office. Woodrow Wilson, 
for example, emphasized its role in preserving the separation of powers 
by ensuring that the administration of public policy by the Executive is 
understood by the legislature and electorate: 
"It is the proper duty of a representative body to look 
diligently into every affair of government and to talk much 
about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and voice, 
and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. 
Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting 
itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative 
agents of the government, the country must be helpless to 
learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both 
scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of dis-
cussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling 
ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that 
it should understand and direct." W. Wilson, Congressional 
Government 303 (1885). 
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Others have vieded the give-and-take of such communication as an important 
means of educating both the legislator and his constituents: 
"With the decline of Congress as an original source of legislatio:p., 
this function of keeping the government in touch with public opinion 
and of keeping the public opinion in touch with the conduct of govern-
ment becomes increasingly important. Congress no longer governs 
the country; the Administration in all its ramifications actually 
governs. But Congress serves as a forum through which public 
opinion can be expressed, general policy discussed, and the conduct 
of governmental affairs exposed and criticized." The Reorganization 
of Congress, A Report of the Committee on Congress of the APSA 
13-14 (1945}. 
Though I fully share these and related views on the educational values served 
by the informing function, there is yet another and perhaps more fundamental 
interest at stake. It requires no citation of authority to state that public 
concern over current issues -- the war, race relations, governmental in-
vasions of privacy -- has transformed itself in recent years into what many 
believe is a crisis of confidence, in our system of government and its capacity 
to meet the needs and reflect the wants of the American people. Communication 
between Congress and the electorate tends to alleviate that doubt by exposing 
and clarifying the workings of the political system, the policies underlying new 
laws and the role of the Executive in their administration. To the extent that 
- 6 -
the informing function succeeds in fostering public faith in the responsive-
ness of Government, it is not only an "ordinary" task of the legislator but 
one that is essential to the continued vitality of our democratic institutions. 
Unlike the Court, therefore, I think that the activities of Congressmen 
in communicating with the public are legislative acts protected by the Speech 
or Debate Clause. I agree with the Court that not every task performed by 
a legislator is privileged; intervention before Executive departments is one 
that is not. But the informing function carries a far more persuasive claim 
to the protections of the Clause. It has been recognized by this Court as 
something "generally done" by Congressmen, the Congress itself has 
established special concessions designed to lower the cost of such communi-
cation, and, most important, the function furthers several well-recognized 
goals of representative government. To say in the face of these facts that 
the informing function is not privileged merely because it is not necessary 
to the internal deliberations of Congress is to give the Speech or Debate 
Clause an artificial and narrow reading unsupported by reason. 
Nor can it be. supported by history. There is substantial evidence 
that the Framers intended the Speech or Debate Clause to cover all communi-
cations from a Congressman to his constituents. Thomas Jefferson clearly 
expressed that view of legislative privilege in a case involving Samuel Cabell, 
Congressman from Virginia. In 1797 a federal grand jury in Virginia investi-
gated the conduct of several Congressmen, including CalDell, in sending 
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newsletters to constituents critical of the administration's policy in the 
war v.i th Franceo The Grand Jury found that the Congressmen had en-
deavored "at a time of real public danger, to disseminate unfounded 
calumnies against the happy government of the United States, and thereby 
to separate the people therefrom; and to increase or produce a foreign 
influence, ruinous to the peace, happiness, and independence of these 
United States." Jefferson immediately drafted a long essay signed by 
himself and several citizens of Cabell's district, condemning the grand 
jury investigation as a blatant violation of the congressional privilegeo 
Revised and joined by James Madison, the protest was forwarded to the 
Virginia House of Delegates. It reads in part as follows: 
" o • o that in order to give to the will of the people the 
influence it ought to have, and the information which may 
enable them to exercise it usefully, it was a part of the 
common law, adopted as the law of this land, that their 
representatives, in the discharge of their functions, should 
be free from the cognizance or coercion of the coordinate 
branches, Judiciary and Executive; and that their communi-
cations with their constituents should be of right, as of duty 
also, be free, full, and una wed by any: that so necessary has 
this intercourse been deemed in the country from which they 
derive their descent and laws, that the correspondence between 
the representative and constituent is privileged there to pass 
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free of expense through the channel of the public post, and that 
the proceedings of the legislature have been known to be arrested 
and suspended at times until the Representatives could go home 
to their several counties and confer with their constituents ..•.• 
"That when circumstances required that the ancient confederation 
of this with the sister States, for the government of their common 
concerns, should be improved into a more regular and effective 
form of general government, the same representative principle 
was preserved in the new legislature, one branch of which was to 
be chosen by the citizens of each State, and the laws and principles 
remained unaltered which privileged the representative functions, 
whether to be exercised in the State or General Government, against 
the cognizance and notice of the coordinate branches, Executive and 
Judiciary; and for its safe and convenient exercise, the inter-
communication of the representative and constituent has been 
sanctioned and provided for through the channel of the public post, 
at the public expense. 
" 0 0 0 
"That the grand jury is a part of the Judiciary, not permanent 
indeed, but in office, pro hac vice and responsible as other judges 
are for their actings and doings while in office: that for the Judiciary 
to interpose in the legislative department between the constituent and 
his representative, to control them in the exercise of their functions 
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or duties towards each other, to overawe the free correspondence 
which exists and ought to exist between them, to dictate what 
communications may pass between them, and to punish all others, 
to put the representative into jeopardy of criminal prosecution, of 
vexation, expense, and punishment before the Judiciary, if his 
communications, public or private, do not exactly square with 
their ideas of fact or right, or with their designs of wrong, is to 
put the legislative department under the feet of the Judiciary, is to 
leave us, indeed, the shadow, but to take away the substance of 
representation, which requires essentially t hat the representative 
be as free as his constituents would be, that the same interchange 
of sentiment be lawful between him and them as would be lawful 
among themselves were they in the personal transaction of their 
own business; is to do away the influence of the people over the 
proceedings of their representatives by excluding from their 
knowledge, by the terror punishment, all but such information or 
misinformation as may suit their own views; and is the more vitally 
dangerous when it is considered that grand jurors are selected by 
officers nominated and holding their places at the v.i ll of the 
Executive o o o; and finally, is to give to the Judiciary, and through 
them the Executive, a complete preponderance over the legislature 
rendering ineffectual that wise and cautious distribution of powers 
made by the constitution bet\\een the three branches, and subordinating 
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to the other two that branch which most depends on the people 
themselves, and is responsible to them at short periods." 
8 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 322-327 (Ford ed. 1904). 
Jefferson's protest is perhaps the most significant and certainly the most 
cogent analysis of the privileged nature of communication between Congress-
man and public. Its comments on the history, purpose and scope of the 
Clause leave no room for the notion that the Executive or Judiciary can in 
any way question the contents of that dialogue. Nor was Jefferson alone 
among the Framers in that view. Aside from Madison, who joined in the 
protest, James Wilson took the position that a member of Congress "should 
enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and ••• should be protected from everyone, 
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. " 
I Works of James Wilson 421 (McCloskey ed. 1967). Wilson, a member of the 
Committee responsible for drafting the Speech or Debate Clause, stated in 
plainest terms his belief in the duty of Congressmen to inform the people 
about proceedings in the Congress: 
"That the conduct and proceedings of representatives should be 
as open as possible to the inspection of those whom they represent, 
seems to be, in republican government, a maxim, of whose truth or 
importance the smallest doubt cannot be entertained. That, by a 
necessary consequence, every measure, which wil facilitate or secure 
this open communication of the exercise of delegated power, should be 
adopted and patronized by the Constitution and law~ of every free state, 
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seems to be another maxim, which is the unavoidable result of 
the former." Id. , at 422. 
Wilson's statements, like those of Jefferson and Madison, reflect a deep 
conviction of the Framers, that self-government can succeed only when 
the people are informed by their representatives, without interfernce 
by the Executive or Judiciary, concerning the conduct of their agents in 
government. That conviction is no less valid today than it was at the time 
of our founding. I would honor the clear intent of the Framers and extend 
to the informing function the protections embodied in the Speech or Debate 
Clause. 
This conclusion is not inconsistent with the English view of legislative 
privilege, which the Court reads as supporting its interpretation of the Clause, 
Ante, at 16. On the contrary, the Speech or Debate Clause of the English 
Bill of Rights was at least in part the product of a struggle between 
Parliament and Crown over the very type of activity involved in this case. 
During the reign of Charles II, the House of Commons received a number of 
reports about an alleged plot between the Crown and the King of France to 
restore Catholicism as the established religion of England. The most famous 
of these reports, Dangerfield's Narrative, was entered into the Commons 
Journal and then republished by order of the Speaker of the House, Sir 
William Williams, with the consent of Commons. In 1686, after James II 
came to the throne, informations charging libel were filed against Williams 
in King's Bench. Despite the arguments of his attorney," Sir Robert Atkyns, 
that the publication-'was necessary to the "counselling" and "enquiring" 
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functions of Parlliment, Williams' plea of privilege was rejected and he 
was finedj'10, 000. Shortly after Williams' conviction James II was sent 
into exile, and a committee was appointed by the House of Commons to 
report upon 11such things as are absolutely necessary to be considered 
for the better securing our Religion, Laws, and Liberties." In reporting 
to the House, the chairman of the committee stated that the provision for 
freedom of speech and debate was included "for the sake of one, . • • Sir 
William Williams, who was punished out of Parliament for what he had 
done in Parliament. n 9 Grey's Debates 81. Following consultation with 
the House of Lords, that provision was included as part of the English Bill 
of Rights, and the judgment against Williams was declared by Commons 
"illegal and subversive of the Freedom of parliament." I Townsend, 
Memoirs of the House of Commons (2d ed. 1844). 
Although the origins of the Speech or Debate Clause in England can 
be traced to a case involving republication, the Court, citing Stockdale v. 
Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 112 K. B. 1112 (1839), says that "English legis-
lative privilege was not viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise 
immune libel on the floor of the House." Ante, at 16. Tha conclusion reflects 
an erroneous reading of precedent. Stockdale did state that "if the calumnious 
or inflammatory speeches should be reported and published, the law will 
attach responsibility on the publisher." But that result was repudiated 
thirty years later in Wason v. Walter, 4 Q. B. 73 (1868): There the proprietor 
of the London Times was sued for printing an acc<;>unt of a libellous debate in 
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the House of Lords. The Court agreed with Stockdale that the House could 
not confer immunity on any publication merely by ordering it printed and 
then asserting parliamentary privilege. The issue for the Court, therefore, 
was whether the publication "is, independently of such order or assertion 
of privilege, in itself privileged and lawful." Id., at 87. On that issue 
the Court severely criticized the reasoning of earlier cases, including 
Stockdale, stating that two of the Justices in that case had expressed a 
"very shortsighted view of the subject." Id., at 91. The Court held that 
so long as the speech itself was privileged, i.e., delivered by a member 
"for the information of his constituents, " id., at 95, republication of the 
speech could not be the basis of a libel action. Relying not on the Parliamentary 
Papers Act of 1840, which was enacted in response to Stockdale, but on the 
analogy to judicial reports and the need for an informed public, the Court 
stated: 
"It seems to us impossible to doubt that it is of paramount public 
and national importance that the proceedings of the houses of 
parliament shall be communicated to the public, who have the 
deepest interest in knowing what passes within their walls, seeing 
that on what is there said and done, the welfare of the community 
depends. Where would be our confidence in the government of the 
country or in the legislature by which our laws are framed, and to 
whose charge the great interests of the country are commited, -
wher_e would be our attachment to the constitution under which we 
live, - if the proceedings of the great council of the realm were 
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shrouded in secresy and concealed from the knowledge of the nation? 
How could the communications between the representatives of the 
people and their constituents, which are so essential to the working 
of the representative system, be usefully carried on, if the con-
stituencies were kept in ignorance of what their representatives 
are doing? What would become of the right of petitioning on all 
measures pending in parliament, the undoubted right of the subject, 
if the people are to be kept in ignorance of what is passing in either 
house? Can any man bring himself to doubt that the publicity given 
in modern times to what passes in parliament is essential to the 
maintenance of the relations subsisting between the government, 
the legislature, and the country ar large?" Id., at 89. 
The fact that the debate wa&(mblished in violation of a standing order of 
Parliament was held to be irrelevant. "Independently of the orders of the 
ho'lB es, there is nothing unlawful in publishing reports of parliamentary 
proceedings • • . • [A] ny publication of its debates made in contravention 
of its orders would be a matter between the house and the publisher. " Id., at 
95. 
Seventy years later, in his memorandum to the House of Commons' 
Select Committee on the Official Secrets Acts, Sir Gilbert Campion, a noted 
scholar, reviewed the publication cases through Wason and concluded: 
"If • o o a member circulated among his constituents a speech made 
by him in Parliament in which he had disclosed information [otherwise 
' 
subject to the Official Secrets Acts], it might be held on the analogy of 
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the principles which have been said to apply to prosecutions for libel 
that he could not be proceeded against for disclosing it to his con-
stituents, unless, of course, the speech had been made in secret 
session. Even if the suggested analogy is not admitted, it would be 
repugnant to common sense to hold that though the original disclosure 
in the House was protected by parliamentary privilege, the circulation 
of the speech among the member's constituents was not." Minutes of 
Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Official Secrets Acts 
29 (1939). 
In my view, therefore, the English precedent, if relevant at all, supports 
Senator Gravel's position in this case. 
Thus, from the standpoint of function or history, it is plain that 
Senator GravePs dissemination of material, placed by him in the record of a 
congressional hearing, is itself legislative activity protected by the privilege 
of Speech or Debate. Whether or not that privilege protects the publisher from 
prosecution or the Senator from Senatorial discipline, it certainly shields the 
Senator from any extra-congressional inquiry about his part in the publication. 
As we held in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (196,6), neither a Congress-
man, nor his aides, nor third parties may be made to test~y concerning 
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privileged acts or their motives. That immunity, which protects legislators 
"from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, " 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951), is the essence of the Clause, 
designed not for the legislators' ''private indulgence but for the public good." 
Id., at 377. 
That privilege, moreover, may not be defeated merely because a 
court finds that the publication was irregular or the material irrelevant to 
legislative business. Legislative immunity secures "to every member 
exemption from prosecution for everything said or done by him as a repre-
sentative in the exercise of the functions of that office, . • . whether the 
exercise was regular, according to the rules of the House, or irregular and 
against their rules." Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808). Thus, if the 
republication of this committee record was unauthorized or even prohibited 
by the Senate rules, it is up to the Senate, not the Executive or Ju:iiciary, to 
fashion the appropriate sanction to discipline Senator Gravel. 
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Similarly, the Government cannot strip Senator Gravel of the 
immunity by asserting that his conduct "did not relate to any Congressional 
business. " Brief, at 41. The Senator has stated that his hearing on the 
Pentagon Papers had a direct bearing on the work of his Subcommittee on 
Buildings and Grounds, because of the effect of the Vietnam War on the 
domestic economy and the lack of sufficient federal funds to provide adequate 
public facilities. If in fact the Senator is wrong in this conteit ion, and his 
conduct at the hearing exceeded the subcommittee's jurisdiction, then again 
it is the Senate that must call him to task. This Court has permitted con-
gressional witnesses to defend their refusal to answer questions on the 
ground of non-germaneness. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1954). 
Here, however, it is the Executive that seeks the aid of the judiciary, not to 
protect individual rights, but to extend its power of inquiry and interrogation 
into the privileged domain of the legislature. In my view the Court should 
refuse to turn the freedom of Speech or Debate on the Government's notions 
of legislative propriety and relevance. We would weaken the very structure 
of our constitutional system by becoming a partner in this assault on the 
separation of powers. 
Whether the Speech or Debate Clause extends to the informing function 
is an issue whose importance goes beyond the fate of a single Senator or Con-
gressman. What is at stake is the right of an elected representative to inform, 
and the public to be informed, about matters relating directly to the workings 
of our Government. The dialogue between Congress and people has been 
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recognized, from the days of our founding, as one of the necessary elements 
of a representative system. We should not retreat from that view merely 
because, in the course of that dialogue, information may be revealed that 
is embarrassing to the other branches of government or violates their notions 
of necessary secrecy. A member of Congress who exceeds the bounds of 
propriety in performing this official task may be called to answer by the 
other members of his chamber. We do violence to the fundamental concepts 
of privilege, however, when we subject that same conduct to judicial and 
executive scrutiny. The threat of "prosecution by an unfriendly executive and 
conviction by a hostile judiciary," United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S., at 179, 
which the Clause was designed to avoid, can only lead to timidity in the per-
formance of this vital function. The Nation as a whole benefits from the 
Congressional investigation and exposure of official corruption and deceit. 
It likewise suffers when that exposure is replaced by muted criticism, carefully 
hushed behind Congressional walls. 
11. 
Equally troubling in today's decision is the Court's refusal to bar 
grand jury inquiry into the source of documents received by the Senator and 
~ -
placed by him in the . hearing record. The receipt of materials for use in a 
congressional hearing is an integral part of the preparation for that legislative 
act. In United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S., 169 (1966), · the Court acknowledged 
the privileged nature. of such preparatory steps, holding that they, like the act 




~ ~ ;_~ 
~ ~ ~ 
Judiciary. That holding merely recogniz the obvious -- that speeches, 
hearings, and the casting of votes requ· e study and planning in adva 
It would accomplish little toward the oal of legislative freedom to exempt an 
official act from intimidating scrutin , if other conduct leading up to the act 
and intimately related to it could be eterred by a similar threat. The 
reasoning that guided the Court in J hnson is no less persuasive today, and 
I see no basis, nor does the Court ffer any, for departing from it here. I 
would hold that Senator Gravel's eceipt of the Pentagon Papers, including 
the name of the per son from om he received it, may not be the subject of 
inquiry by the grand jury. 
~~---------------I would go further, however, and also exlude from grand jury inquiry 
any knowledge that the Senator or his aides might have concerning how the 
"'-
source himself first came to possess tl;le Papers. This immunity, it seems 
to me, is essential to the performance of the informing function. Corrupt 
and deceitful officers of government do net often post for public examira tion 
the evidence of their own misdeeds. That evidence must be ferreted out, and a __ t I f.j;...,... 
often is, by fellow employees and subordinates. Their willingness t~l 
that information and spark.Con,aessional inquiry may well depend on assurances 
\......... --- .......... ,_, -from their contact in Congress that their identity and means of obtaining the 
~ --~----------------------------------------evidence wi. ll be held in strictest confidence. To permit the grand jury to 
frustrate that expectation through an inquiry of the Congressman and his aides 
can only dampen the flow of inforim tion to the Congress and thus to the American 
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people. . There is a similar risk, of course, when the member's own House 
requires him to break the confidence. But the danger,it seems to me, is 
far less if the members' colleagues, and not an "unfriendly executive" or 
"hostile judiciary," are charged with evaluating the propriety of his conduct. 
In any event, assuming that a Congressman can be required to reveal the 
sources of his information and the methods used to obtain that information, 
that power of inquiry, as required by the Clause, is that of the Congressman's 
House, and of that House only. 
I respectfully dissent. 
4/17/72 
MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL 
ReNo. 71-1017, 71-1026, Gravel v. u.s. 
Because the issues in this case seem particularly difficult 
to focus on, owing primarily, I suspect, to the unique nature 
of this litigation, I will attempt to summarize the arguments 
of the parties before suggesting any analysis of the case. 
( Hah 1) 
The summaries will necessarily be shor~, in part because I am 
not going to attempt to d~ all the historical material in 
this memo. I have not yet the amicus briefs ~. with the 
J\.. I 
8R~~~RKYEkX$xKR~MMRNX$ exception of the Senate's brief. 
xxxxx~exxxNxxSxxxexxEERRRRxxxxex As the case now stands, CA 1 -
has ruled that Senator Gravel's immunity under the Speech 
or Debate clause extends to written reports of committee 
proceedings. The immunity prohibits the executive and judicial 
branches from inquiring into the acquisition of information 
introduced into a judicial proceeding because such inquires 
might dry up a Senator's sources and chill his willingness 
to search out information. The privilege was not found to 
extend to republication of the subcommitte record which was 
the proper subject of a grand jury inquiry. CA 1 found that 
the dependency of Senator's on their aids was so strong that 
it was essential that the Senator be able to exercise his 
privilege to prevent any aid from testifying about any matter 
on which the Senator himself could assert his privilege before 
a grand jury. Even persons who were not Senatorial aids could 
not be questioned about legislative motivation ~gx~~~~XKM8 
~NmRXX£XNXKXK11U~NXXMXM~NXXXMHXtKX~N~Xl§M«~~W since the executive 
7 
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had no authority to inquire into that motivation, but the 
govt could inquire into the conduct of third parties including 
their relationships with Sen Gravel so long as motivation was 
not the subject of the inquiry. In a somewhat confusing 
section of the opinion, the court ruled that republication 7 
might be protected from govt inquiry by a more general form ' 
of legislative immunity, not founded in the Speech or Debate 
Clause, analagous to executive immunity. The result of this 
opinion is to forbid the grand jury from calling Sen Gravel 
to testify concerning any aspect of his connection with the 
Pentagon Papers--something which the govt was evidently not 
going to do in any case. Aids to Sen Gravel may testify about -
events before their employment or about events not related to 
the papers, but they may not testify about events after their 
employment which relate to Sen Gravel's use of the Penatagon 
Papers. This would include republication which)although exempt 
from the Speech or Debate immunity, was covered by the more 
7 general legislative immunity. Third pa#s, in this case 
officals of publishing houses, were permitted to testify about 
any aspect of the Pentagon papers and their negotiations with 
Sen Gravel with the exceptiontion of his motivation. As I 
analyze the opinion of CA 1, it takes a functional approach. 
It says that the Speech or Debate clause applies only to 
legislative activites done in the House, and hence not to 
republication. It then extends the immunity to third persons 
and aids to the extent it thinks necessary to protect the 
underlying value of the Clause, viz , the protection of legis-
-3-
lative activity from judicial and executive interference. ,, 
I l 
Finally, it recognizes a xxgNEXE more vague area of protection, 
___.... ----- .J 
outside the scope of the Speech or Debate clause, covered ~ 
by legislative immunity--a doctrine, which like ex~~ 1 
or judicial immunity, stems from the seperation of powers 
-...._:: -
directly without textual support in the Constitution. 
SENATOR GRAVEL' ARGUMENTS 
I. REPUBLICATION: The Senator begins with the statement 
from Kilbourn v. Thompson that the Speech or Debate clause 
protects all things "generally done in a session of the House 
by one of its members in relation to business before it." 
Kilbo~- was the first Speech or Debate case decided by this 
Court, and its statement of the scope of the clause has been 
accepted in the cases that followed. From an historical analysis 
of the privilege in England, he argues that its scop~as always 
been determined by the actual functions performed by the 
legislature. When those functions changed, the privilege 
changed along with~it. Ultimately, in England, the circulation 
by members of the legislature of their speeches and other 
proceedings became privileged. In addition to this history, 
the framers had in mind the N~X~XNXXXNE seperation of powers 
doctrine, not a part of the English law, ,which must vary 
with the times so that it can be effective. 
) 
Today, it is argued, one practice commonly engaged in by 
members of Congress and essential to the goals of a representative 
government is the informing funcition of communicating with the 
public. In a representative democracy, the public must be 
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informed of the important issues of the day. Consequently, 
almost every Congressman in some way or another, often by 
newsletter, republishes materials and speeches that he has 
entered in the Record. While there may be a different case 
when this republication is used to interfere with the rights 
of an individual by slandering him or in some other way, 
when there is no such situation, the only issue becomes the 
seperation of powers. If the executive can institute grand 
jury proceedings and interrogate witnesses about a Senator's 
exercise of his informing function, it may interfere with a 
legislator's communication with his constituents. For this 
reason, the Framers intended that the Speech or Debate clause 
bar the executive and the judiciary from interfering with 
this legislative function. The Senator cites Jefferson's 
opposition to a grar~ jury investigation of a newsletter 
sent by Congressmen Cabell which was critical of foreign policy. 
Other quotes in favor of open communications are cited. Art I, 
Sec. 5 requiring the publication of a record of Congressional 
proceedings establishes xkxx the duty of legislators to communicate. 
Finally, the Mathew Lyon case is cited. 
The Senator also relies on English history. The legislative 
free speech clause of the English Bill of Rights grew di~ectly 
from a prosecution of a member for publishing a committee 
report. While the tradition in England of the right of newspapers 
to make public debates in the legislature differs from our own, 
owing to the original fear that such publications would lead to 
prosecutions by a hostile Crown, the law in that area also 
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evolved to the point where such a right exists. This too was 
an acknowledgement of the legislatures duty to inform and the 
people's right to know. 
Finally, insofar as the opinion of CA 1 hints that the 
proceedings which led to the publication in the subcommittee 
records were irregular, that fact is irrelevant. Courts can 
not supervize leg islatures to the extent of disapproving of 
procedures a legilslature chooses to adopt in carrying out its 
function. If an individual legislator acts in an irregular 
way, only the legislature has authority to so determine and 
to act. 
THE SG'S ARGUMENTS 
I. REPUBLICATION: The SG agrees with CA 1 that Speech 
or Debate immunity applies only to things done "in either 
House." Whilh informing members and publishing committee 
reports is essential to the functioning within the House, 
the private republication of committee reports is not. In 
United States v. Johnson, the Court ruled that intercession 
with the executive branch, something commonly done by Congressmen, 
was none-the-less not protected by the Speech or Debate clause. 
There is no support for extending the privilege to 
.A._ 
republication from English history. The legilslature or~ginally 
sought privacy. Members were criminally punished on the basis 
of republication of their leg islative speeches. Only since 
1868, after the Constitution was written, XNN was the privilege 
extended to republication, and then the extention was effectuated 
in part by statute. While American authorities are sparse, 
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there is a district court case, McGovern v. Martz, which says 1 
that republication is not protected, and some others which seem 
to lean the same way. 
CA 1 spoke also of a general lee;islative privilege,analgous \ 
to executive or judicial privilege. But such privilege 
extends only to immunity from tort liability and not to 
testifying before a grand jury. The idea behind the immunity 
is that discretionary decisions should not be the basis of 
liability. This does not require immunity from grand jury 
testimony. Thus, while the SG re~cgnizes such a privilege, -he does not think it applies in this case. It certainly does 
not apply, however, to third perrsons who are not legislative 
aids and who have no leg islative function. 
xxxxxxxxxSRRRgMx®Rx'9RR1t'XRxxMMMNxXXx®"RxHRSx1t~x~MxR'9xR1tR'XxRSx 
SENATOR GRAVEL'S REPLY BRIEF 
&n'f ;s h 
In his reply brief, Sen Gravel points out that the case 
II 
which established the liability of a member of the leg islature 
for republished statements was soon repudiated, in part by a 
revolution against the King . More recent cases had repudiated 
the doctrine of the case insofar as it applied to this issue 
before any statute was enacted. 
On the matter of leg islative privilege, Sen Gravel points 
out that the President claims that the privilege extends not 
to just immunity from tort liability but to immunity from 
testimony before a Congressional committee. The argument 
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advanced for this proposition, turns on the President's need 
to communicate with his aids in secret. Why does the legislative 
branch not have the same need and privilege? 
THE SG" AR GUMENT 
II . SPEECH OR DEBATE IMMUNITY OF AIDS AND THIRD PARTIES: 
On its face, the Speech or Debate Clause extends only to XRXXOC 
~axxms: "the Senators and Representatives." Even though the 
number of aids and the dependency on them was probably not 
estimatea in 1787, it was certainly realized at the time 
that Congress would have some employees, and legal action 
directed at these employees must have been forseeable. 
"~ile English history on the immunity of aids under the speech 
privilege is hazy, there is history on the privelge against 
arrest which is also found in Art I, Sec 6. That history 
shows that because of abuse, the privilege of servants and 
families of legislators not to be arrested was withdrawn. 
When this history is read in light of the clear language of 
the Constitution and contempraneous statements, it shows that 
only legislators were protected. 
In two suits brought against members of Congress and 
their employees to correct erroneous Congressional action, 
\ 
the Court has dismissed the suit against the Congressmen on 
Speech or Debate grounds , and has sustained the jurisdiction 
against the employees. In Kilbourn v. ThomQQon , the plaintiff 
sued Congressmen and a sergeant-at-arms for taking him to custody 
on a contempt citation. In Powell v. McCormack , the plaintiff 
sued members of the House plus the doorkeeper -for denying him 
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seat. In both cases, employees of the leg istature were 
r---------
held responsible for their particiapation in unconstitutional 
activity. Although Dombrowski v. Eas:tla!ld contains evidence , 
that suggests that s ome privilege extends also to leg islative 
aids, the privlege miscussed in that case was the general 
leg islative priv~ge. Of course, if the speech or debate 
privilege ca nnot be asserted on the behalf of aids, it cannot 
be asserted on the behalf of other persons. 
This interpretation is consistent with sound policy. 
The main function of the Speech or Debate clause is to immunize ~~ 
leg islators from harassment by civil or criminal suit. 
could 
The only thing that RENNN result from questioning aids is 
/""\. 
to make it more diff~ic~ to hire them, but that is a far cry 
from subjecting members to liability. Any embarassment from 
quest.iwning an aid is too minor when compared with society's 
interest in prosectuing crimes. Aids, unlike Congressmen, 
are not subject to majority control or to Congressional discipline. 
The sweeping privilege asserted by Sen. Gravel could be used 
to protect those not closely related to the functioning of 
the leg islature by putting them on the staff. 
SENATOR GRAVEL 'S ARGUHENTS 
II. SPEECH OR DEBATE I HHUNITY OF AIDS AND THI RD PARTIES: 
Sen. Gravel argues that the SG has mis-interpreted his position. 
He does not claim that his aids should be bathed with immunity 
for their acts or that they have any privilege at all. He 
asserts that he has an immunity from having the executive or 
judiciary question his leg islative acts, and that he can 
assert this immunity to prevent the govt from inquiring into 
his leg islative acts by compelling testimony from his aidso 
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Morep{er, he claims that CA 1 erred by not ruling that any 
inquiry as to third parties concerning his leg islative aets, 
as opposed to merely thel~otivation for those acts, was also 
subject to the Senator's privilege, In Johnson, the Court would 
not permit inquiry of third parties as to how, as opposed to 
why a speech was prepared. If such inquiry can be made, it 
will be difficult to distinguish when motivation and when some-
thing else is the subject of the inquiry. Motivation will be 
readily inferred in some instances. 
Inquiry of leg islative acts by subpoenaing third parties 
has the same potential for intimidation and harassment as does 
i:R subpoenaing a leg isltor. If a Sen~ cannot depend on his 
aids,he will be inhibited in carrying out his duties. In some 
English cases, persons who had a relationship with a leg islator, 
were not allowed to g ive cestimony because of infringment of 
the leg islator's privilege. Johnson was to the same effect. 
In .QQmbrQ.Nski v. Eastland, the Court .said that KRxem~XI&}CVf:R~rs: 
XmMNNX~XWKs:xxes:s: a Senator's immunity was less absolute, but 
appl icable. Powell v. McCormack was different because the 
employee was ministerial and because he was carrying out an 
unconstitutional act of the House. It was the legality of the 
act which was examined, not the motivation of legislators 
or an,'5i' deliberation. Similarly in Kilbourne v. Thompson, 
the holding was that a ministerial employee could be enjoined 
from carrying out an unconstitutional act, not that he could 
be questioned about legislative acts. 
RiRKXX~¥ the seperation of powers problem is made more 
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serious when aids on whom a legisltor depends and printer$, 
without whom he would be unable to communicate with his constitu-
ents are the subject of the inquiry. It is quite permissible 
to ask these persons anything that does not concern the 
leg islative process, but to require them to answer questions 
about the leg islative process will destroy their relationship 
with x leg islators. xfxxRe 
Finally, Sen. Gravel would balance the social interests 
different from the SG. He says that the govt has no compelling 
need to call these people. If there is le~islative misconduct, 
the leg islature itself is the proper person to grant relief. 
If there were a victim of E±rix legislative abuse, then the 
courts might have jurisdiction. It is rare that any wrongdoing 
will go unpunished because of this interpretation of the 
privilege, but if it does, that is a price we pay for separation 
of powers. Finally, the privilege could be asserted only by 
the member, so only if he a greed could misconduct of others 
be covered up. 
In specific response to the SG, Sen. Gravel makes several 
points. The privilege against Ex±m±Hx arrest is historically 
distinct and seperate E from the sp~ech privilege. The location 
of the two privileges in the same section is caused by stylistic 
econmmy not by historical design. So is the fact that the 
Speech or Debate privilege is writen in terms that limit it 
to members of Congeess rather than by subject matter. That 
resulted from a stylistic change at the convention. Nor is 
the SG correct that the privilege is primarily to avoid civil 
suits; the privilege is primiarily motivated by separation of 
-11-
powers. 
THE SENATE' ARGUMENT -The Senate supports the position of Sen. Gravel. It adds 
one argument to his. It argues the Court ought to accept its 
g_osition on the extent of the Speech or Debate privilege as a 
matter of comity due bo a co-equal branch. If the Senate -------
says that it needs the privilege to be interpreted that broadly 
the Court ought to do so. 
The SG replys that it is the Court's duty, not the Senate's, 
to interpret the Constitution. 
-12-
DISCUSSION 
In Brewster the appraoch we took toward the Speech or 
Debate clause was that it protected only leg islative acts, - -
i.e., things generally said or done in either House. That 
is both a narrow and a broad interpretation. Narrow in that 
it does not cover all the activities of leg islators--Brewster's 
alleged a greement to vote a certain way in return for a bri~e; 
Johnson's attempt to influence the Justice Department. Broad 
in that it recgonizes that sppech or debate is to be given 
more than its literal meaning. Thus, it would seem clear to 
me that any leg islative activity done in the legislature is 
protected by the speech or debate clause. In this case, Sen. 
Gravel's introdoution of the Penuagon papers into his subcommittee 
hear in (I think it is ~ implcit in the past 
cases that in _leg islature does not just mean on the floor 
of the House, but also includes offical acts taken in committee. 
The clause itself talks about acts done"in the House" not on 
the floor.) 
I would also think that Sen. Gravel's acquisition of 
the papers would be covered, although I am not quite so sure 
7 , ~here. To take a ludicrous case, if he had been apprehended 
~\~v~~ breaking into an office to get information to use in a committee 
11114 ~ .... ?, JYl hearing , one would hesitate to call that a legislative act. 
~ On the other hand,if the executive has the power to ask a 
Senator where and how he got the infromation he introduced into 
the record, it is surely inquiring into a legislative act. 
)
I suppose that the decision in Johnson is determinative on 
this point. In Johnson the Court ruled not only that the Speech 
(!) 
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or Debate clause prohibited the govt from basing a prosecution 
on a speech made on the floor of the House, but also that 
the govt could not inquire as to how the speech was written. 
If the govt cannot base a prosecution on something that is 
introduced into the record of a subcommittee, it would seem, 
by close analagy, that it could not inquire as to where the 
infromation came from. 
I a gree with the government, however, that republication 
is not protected by the Speech or Debate clause. I do not 
focusing 
mean that the govt can by XNKMKHK on the act of republication, 
inquire back . into leg islative acts, but that as long as it 
I 
asks about the ~ctual republication, it is on safe ground. 
(Incidentally, I have ·never quite understood what possible 
relevance to anything Sen Gravel ' s offering of these papers 
to publishing houses, by itself, with no reference to their 
acquisition, coul d have.) Republication is not an act done 
in the house. While I a gree that it is essential to modern 
\.. 
communications between representative and constituent, I don't 
think it fits under the interpretation of the clause put forth 
in Brewster. Gravel argues that the scope of the privilege 
must expand with the times, as indeed it must, but only with ,. "' respect to leg islative acts as they have been defined. I 
f . d
11 b. . . b . '1 ,' ·~ -Ln repu lLcatLon to e sLmL ar to Ln~ercession with the 
"' executive, which the Court found not to be protected in John2Qg. 
(I pass for the moment the question of whether republication 
is protected, and to what extent, by a general legislative 
privilege.) 
-14-
As I see it, the legislator can invoke a privilege to 
prevent the executive and the judiciary from inquiring into 
II. \I. It v 
course of the 
I 
any legislative act--an act occurring in the 
,I. 
leg is l ative process. It does not seem to me that this privilege 
should be so limited that the executive is prohibited from 
inquiring into a legislative act only if it does so in a direct 
manner by attempting to question a leg islator. The Speech or 
Debate clause provides: 
"and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned 
in any other Place." 
The SG makes a great deal of the fact that only Senators and 
Representatives have the privilege, but Sen, Gravel does not 
argue differently. He does not request that aids and third 
persons should also have the privilege. Instead he argues 
that the privilege means that the executive may not questio~ ·~~~ 
speech or debate. Once it is determine that the subject \ ~ r 
vY' \, __ 
matter of the questioning is speech or debate, it does not-- _'QA 
""~-
matter how the questioning is carried out; the leg islator ~w~ 
1 
has a privilege and can stop it. Thus, if the executive ~~S 
seeks to question speech or debate by questioning aids who 
have knowledge of it or even by questioning third persons 
about it, the legislator has a privilege to stop that questioning . 
The SG's arguments to the contrary do not seem convincing . 
As I said, they are premised on the theory that Sen. Gravel 
wants the privlege to be extended to his aids. But the 
p~ilege ~this case was not invoked by the aid or by~the 
publishers; it was invoked by Sen. Gravel when he intervened. 
--=~-----...-/ 
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And that is all he seeks. The claim that it must have been 
known that the Congress would have employees is MXX weak not 
only because it is another argument based on this faulty 
premise, but also because there is no reason to think that 
this type of employee was anticipated; we have nothing bpt 
the SG's assertion. History is confused, and I see no conclusion 
to be drawn from the arrest privilege. The two precedents 
of Kilbourne v. Thompson and Powell v. McCormack are the 
SG's strongest points, but even they are in conflict with 
langague in Dombrowski v. Eastland. More importantly, in both 
of those case there was no attempt to inquire into speech or 
debate; they attempt was to enjoin an illegal act taken not 
by a single legislator E~xmrx but by an entire House. Just 
as there would be no Speech or Debate reason that would prevent 
the enjoining of an official who is seeking to carry out an 
illegal or unconstitutional Act of Congress; so should there 
be no reason to prevent the enjoining of an employee of a 
House from carrying out an illegal or unconstitutional act 
of that single House. In both Kilbo~ and Powell the result 
of legislative acts--in effect, one-House legislation--was 
enjoined. Legislative activity--activity in passing and 
deliberating on legislation--was not enjoined or subjected 
to inquiry. 
I would therefore say that when activity falls under 
the Speech or Debate definition, a legislator has a privilege 
to prevent the govt from inquiring into it regardless of how 
the govt attempts to do so. Thus, neither Sen. Gravel's aids ______., 
-16-
nor third parties could be asked about the Senator's legislative 
activities~ To that .extent, I would differ from CA 1 which -
said that the grand jury could not inquire into only certain 
kinds of legislative activity by asking third persons--it 
said only legislative motivation was ke~ protected. 
There remains the problem of legislative privilege. 
Executive privilege does not stem from any provision of the 
/\ 
Constitution; it ari~ses, inherently, out of the separation 
of powers. There is also xN a judicial privilege; judges are 
immune from §1983 litigationx alleging that they are ruling 
in such a way as to violate civil rights. (That is ofE course 
) 
in state court, but there is also a federal precedent.) 
No one denies that there is alfi'some kind of legislative 
privilege to be asserted by a legislator over his or his 
aids E~ being subpoened to testify. The SG says xN::xx that 
the privilege is limited to liability in tort suits, but 
as the ITT hearings are showing, executive privilege is not 
asserted to be so narrow. I don't know exactly what to say 
about legislative privqlege, but I think that if the President 
could prevent an aid from testifying about executive activity 
before a grand jury, a legislator ahould be able to do the 
same. Neithe7 of cours~ could prevent testi~ony about matters 
( 
that had nothing to do with legislative activity. Therefore, 
I think that minimally, legislative privilege could b..:_ prop::_sly 
~ed to preve.:::_his aids ~stifying about legisla:fve 
ac~ivit~ore the grand jury even if the Speech or Djbate 
EXXXN clause does not extend that far. 
-17-
What about republication? That may not be legislative 
activity covered by the speech or« debate clause, but it is 
none.:.the-less X!R"gi:s:xa:xi:xe activity properly carried on by 
legislators within our Constitutional scheme. Like CA 1, 
I do not know whether leg islative privlege could be invoked 
to prevent inquiry into such activity. I know of no xxa 
anal gies to executive privlege, and I have not researched 
this particular problem at all. I guess the way to approach 
the question is to ask whether repubication is the kind of 
legislative activity:K which the Constitution would want to 
keep entirely separate from executive and judicial intervention • 
• r' 1\ / 
But to su~ggest an apprp~ch is not to suggest an answer. I 
would stay open on this :Jli~N point until there is some time to 
research or at least think about it some mo~. 
Fox 
No. 71-1017 GRAVEL v. UNITED STATES Argued 4/19/72 
~~ 
-  ~ VLu., £-<.v~ f/f?~ 





~'1~ k.! - 'i.~· 
~~'--~~· 
lz_ .s.~s~~ . · 
~~~ ~-~ (r-~ I 
~~ /......_ ~ _J.J!....j 










- 1...-l-~~~ ~ 
(]___,____ 4-c ~ ~ J ~ .._,___ 
~-~~~ 
 ~ -<.._.~~evU~ 
~ ~..._~~'/.~ 




~~~~ ~ '- d2-c.- ~­
~~~-
~ ~~~~4 
~ Py- ~ . C!~-·.AJJJ."s-
CL.t:---1---' ~I /:. v~~ ~. - . '-' 
~-~ ~~ ~ u~
--  
~~~~~1-o~. 
{L . ~t;v ~ ~~ ~ 
~~ - + Lo.-~--~-~ ~ 




err :s- ~ & ~~, 




,, I - ,, - - - - ~A ~ I 
I • ~t'"'V"VJ 'f-. ~f  
~Qj~ 
2._ . (·~ {/y ~ ' \ 




~~ U-t1-M ~~ ~ ~ 
~~-~ .~~~~ 
 ~ /.2..,1-ct~. 
~ 1-<-J ~ _A-e4 . 
~~~~~· ~1 
~~~~1-o 
~ G,{CvvJ.) ~ 
,,~"~ ··~ t-4., ~ ~- ~?._._, ~ 
~~~2--~ . ~~~~ 
~r-~- ~~~~ 
~ ~ ~ o-f ~ ~~1-o 
jvv- w--WJ-~ ~~. ~ 
~~~~~~~~ 
~.~~ ~W/· -4_. ~. ~ 
~ 
~ .._,__. ~ ~ l'r-'_ ~ 
~- ~~~· ~~Hu.-t 
~c~l~~~~9! ~~~ 
~~~~vo~~~-
~ K.;_, ~-~ ~ ~ 
~ ~ lf--~~ -~ c:f 
. 
-~ ~ d-~ ¢:i_Tw-o ~~ 
~
rt- ~ ~· ~H.j. ~~ 
-- ~ s~. 








s. &.  U4 ~ ~. 'U...<!J ~ 
~ ~ 7 ?-r<'~,J-- ~~ ~ ~ 
~ ~~hht~~~ . 
9t ~ ~~) '""::'~ ~ ~ 
~~~~~~ 
I~ ~ '-1.--~ ...,.. • Q • ..-t. 
~k~~~~ 
·~~~~{'_·1 
- 1. ·.~ 
~ ~ <>--fl!€iir. &. Cf- . ~ 
. u..rl-u ~ .-? ~0 0.- . . 
4- 1-<J ~ ~ .Y t-:1 ., :r y ---u~ 
rfY.J ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~u---s~ 
Tk.e_ ~~ ~t:o -
~-~~to~ 
~- ~ ~,~ 1 ~~· ~ 
~~H<.d-~~·· 
7, 









~~'~.~~ / W-L~ 
s::d-~ ~: &~fl~ 
~. -
w__Q_ ~ ...4-~ ~ 
~~. ~"1 P/P~ 
~~~~~~ 
~~~~~ 
~ Gj~· ~~1:'":::" 




'-/- 7 t/~ ~ '1-3 ~ 
~~· if~(?~ 
~ ,::::-~· ~· ~ 
~-y~~~ 
-'£A-{) ~~~ ~ Nlf ,/ 
~~ ~ ~ Q <P-?-- 4J 
<(!;!:,_ ~~ ~ Ufl>-t ~














~ 1 G. JJ.-~ Hu_ ~ {~ 
-~aA "' ~~ ) - ~ 'f 't'' ·~ r·- I tt¥ ;z-. ~ ~ /.L~ H.u._ J?~ ~ 
t ~~~-
: I 
~ ---t --?~1 ~~~~~ 





J;..~. ·-) s ( }'W~~. ---~ 
. -
Cl.: t --t - L;U de... • Q~ -k a..t:t.y.«, L.VL-4 ~ (J.,, ~ ~ ' 
ltV- t} - I t!..,.C.. .... ...r A~ :..J a. ~ ~~ 
~.;.._,~~ ~~ ....._-1-.J ,,~~ 
n..:...~~~ 
/..cJ-,.. t,. I,..&. ... u_ ~ : C~-t t:~o 4..e.._ 
a,,p._ o .. .,~:.,. ~~~ 







'' ' ..,_ I. • I '· a..t,t lk.~ .... ,, ~ 4..-• ~ -~ 0 X ta"o u :. /01 "ell) - ~ -..(..L ~~ 
Q, A··~ ~..v~fw«c~ ~ ~ 
I ~~ .......,_ ~~ ~'*·wa... 
1· ~v- c........AJ.....L.. ~~)~~~~,..4.·.~ 
u-rf::!,.)~ ~~~ ~~··4v£..JUV' 
4• ·.._J 
!.?~ 
lfp/ss lee 4/20/72 
No. 71-1017 GRAVEL v. U.S. 
Abstract of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) 
This is the first major case involving the Speech and Debate 
clause. It involved a suit for damages brought by Kilbourn against 
the Sgt. at Arms of the House and several members of a House Com-
mittee which had adjudged him to be in contempt and ordered his 
imprisonment for 45 days. 
In holding that the Speech and Debate clause protected members 
of Congress, Justice Miller (pp. 201 et seq. of the opinion) reviewed 
the history of the clause, cited and quoted from the leading English 
case of stockdale v. Hansard (p. 202), and from the leading Massachusetts 
case of Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, and then reached the following 
conclusion: 
"It seems to us that the views expressed in the 
authorities we have cited are soundmd are applicable 
to this case. It would be a narrow view of the 
constitutional provision to limit it to words spoken 
in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in 
its application to written reports presented in that 
body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, 
though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and 
to the act of voting, whether it is done verbally or by 
passing between the tellers. In short, tcthi ngs generally 
done in a session of the House by one of its members 
in relation to the business before it. 
"It is not necessary to decide here that there may 
not be things done, in the one House or the other, of an 
extraordinary character, for which the mbmers who 
take part in the act may be held legally responsible. 
(p. 204) 
2. 
It is to be noted that Justice Miller did not go beyond action in 
the House . However, Chief Justice Parsons of Massachusetts in 
Coffin v. Coffin, did use some dictum that goes quite far. He stated 
that his opinion was not confined to what the member did in "his place 
in the House;' saying that he was "satisfied that there are cases in 
which (a member) is entitled to this privilege when no within the walls 
of the representative's chamber." (203-204). 
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No. 71-1017 and 71-1026 GRAVEL v. U.S. 
Abstract - U.S. v. Johnson, 383 
u. s. 169 ( 1965). 
This leading case, opinion by Harlan, involved the criminal prosecution 
o f Johnson (a former Congressman), Frank Boykin (another Congressman) 
and three others - charged with conspiracy to exert influence on the Department 
of Justice to obtain dismissal of indictments against savings and loan officers 
for mail fraud. 
Johnson made a speech in the House, which the evidence indicated 
was prepared for him by others, and for which he was paid by the savings 
and loan co-conspirators. 
At the trial, Johnson himself, and others, were examined about the 
speech, how it was written, his personal knowledge of factual material in 
the speech, and his motivation. 
or 
History of Speech Xllll Debate Clause 
Harlan reviews briefly, and interestingly, the history of the Clause, 
showing that there was no discussion of it in the constitutional convention; 
that it was taken from the Articles of ~Confederation, which in 
turn came almost verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. 
2. 
Justice Harlan noted that few cases had dealt with the Clause. He 
refers to Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (see p. 179 of Harlan's 
opinion), and to Penny v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (see p. 17~ of Harlan 
opinion). 
Purpose of the Clause and Its Extent 
In holding that Johnson was protected by the Clause from the questions 
asked him, the Court said: 
"Even though no English or American case casts bright light 
on the one before us, it is apparent from the history of the 
clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire 
to avoid private suits such as those in Kilbourn and Penny, 
but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and 
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary. " 
(180) 
The opinion also stated: 
"The privilege has been recognized as an important 
protection of the independence and integrity of the legis-
lature. '' ( 178) 
But in discussing the scope of the privilege, there is a good deal of 
language in the opinion which indicates that it relates only to "due functioning 
of the legislative process", and is concerned primarily - if not exclusively -
with what transpires in "a session of the House". The Court: 
"No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be 
successfully contended, that the speech or debate clause 
reaches conduct ... that is in no wise related to the due 
functioning of the legislative process. " (p. 172). 
At another point, the Court said - in discussing Kilbourn: 
"The Court (in Kilbourn) held that the privilege should be 
read broadly, to include not only 'words spoken in debate', 
but anything 'generally done in a session of the House by 
one of its members in relation to the business before it. " 
Holding: 
3. 
In holding that Johnson could not be interrogated - or anyone else 
as to Johnson's "motives" - the Court emphasized the motivation point: 
The essence of such a charge (of conspiracy) is that the 
Congressman's conduct was improperly motivated, and 
as will appear that is precisely what the speech or debate 
clause generally forecloses from executive and judicial 
inquiry. " (p. 180) 
At several other points, Justice Harlan emphasized that there could 
be no inquiry into motives or intentions. 
In quoting from the English case of ex parte Wason, the following 
statement by Mr. Justice Lush was quoted: 
"I am clearly of opinion that we ought not to allow it to 
be doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions 
of members of either house cannot be inquired into by 
criminal proceedings with respect to anything that they 
may do or say in the House." (p. 183). 
~ ...... ~ d. • oC.k.,.A.., c.,.,......_.e_ 
~ c:.e. .... . ... ..:t: ... .f() ~ 
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U. S. v . Gravel 
Justice Brennan ' s memo , attached , adequately states the 
background of this case and the ruling of CA 1 **x«~x(Aldridgei 
HcEntee , Coffin). Bo:th the govt and Senator Gravel MRN have 
applied for cert in this case . The govt does not contest 
that Sen Gravel's petition should be NRNXRN~ gr~d , but 
the Senator does contest the granting of the govt ' s petition . 
I think that both should be gratned . 
The Senator seeks to challenge the ruling of CA 1 that 
republication of the RRNRK Pentagon papers , which he read 
into the public record of his committee hearings , is not 
challenged by the Speech or Debate Clause . He claims that 
informing the public of legislative acts and of matters of 
.... - . 
-2-
concern to Congress is a legislative act and that the Clause 
prevents x~N the govt from R inquiring into legislative acts. 
The Senator also challenges the ruling that the grand jury may 
inquire of persons with whom the S~nator dealt, aside from his 
staff, so long as it does not inquire into legislative motivation. 
They argue essentially that this is an unworkable limitation 
which will chill the x~ freedom of the legislator. 
The govt challenges the holding that the grand jury may 
not call Senator Gravel's aids and that it may not inquire 
into legislative motives. It says that the aids are not 
protected by K~NX the clause, and that inquiry into legislative 
motivation may be relevant for purposes other than the prosecution 
of the legislator. For example, if a legislator has taken a 
bribe, it may be necessary to inquire into his motives, not to 
prosecute him, but to prosecute the briber. In reply, the 
Senator points out that RG the govt has in the past recognized 
that a legislator cannot operate without aids and that his 
ability to function will be greatly impaired if the govt may 
inquire of his aids about legislative acts. l:N He says that 
all courts have ruled that the Speech or Debate Clause applies 
to aids, and that the govt has consistently argued this position 
itself. 
Although I tend to agree with the Senator that some immunity 
should be extended to aids, there is a question as to how much. 
This Court has R~~xx never ruled on the problema The pre~ise 
I 
perameters of the Speech or Debate Clause have never been precisel 
defined because there have so few x~ cases. This case, along 
with Brewster which is being reargued, give the Court a chance 
to thoroughly consider those perameters. 
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As the attached letter shows, another case XHX raising 
issues similar to this one is coming up ~kNXM on cert from 
~a CA DC . I do not think that is relevant to your disposition 
of this cert, except that it probably indicates a split in 
the circuits. If you grant Gravel and theN other case proves \ 
to be certworthy, it can be set with Gravel at a later date. 
/ Fox 
·f · 
'. · ......... 
71-/or7 
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OFFICE:: OF THI: tvLc::..l K 
SUPREME COURT, U.S. poe, et al. v. McMilla~_,~_!: al., 
No. 71-1027 (D.C. Cir., January 20, 1972) 
.. Dear Mr. Seaver: 
Please be advised that the Urban La~;v Institute of Antioch 
College, counsel for appellants in the referenced-case, intends 
to file in the Supreme Court, no later than Monday, March 13, \ 
1972, and earlier if possible, a petition for a writ of certiorari 
seeking revic"liv of the January 20, 1972 decision by a divided pm1.el 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dist-r-i-c-t---of- -Columbia 
Circuit. 
The petition will present questions as to the existence or 
scope of immunity enjoyed by the Chairman and members of a Committee 
of Congress, under Article 1, Section 6, of the Constitution, when 
sued in a federal court by private citizens alleging a violation 
of their right to privacy as a result of the contents of a report 
prepared by the staff of the Committee. The petition will also 
present questions as to the existence or scope of Article 1, 
_Section 6, immunity of Congressional Committee staff members or 
-~onsultants who are not close personal aides of the Congressman, 
officials and employees of the Government Printing Office, and officials 
and employees of the District of Columbia public school system 
who dealt 1i•7ith and provided private information to Committee staff 
members or consultants. The petition \•7ill also present questions as 
to the interplay of Article 1, Section 6, immtmity and the doctrine 
of official immunity. 
. · ~ / ~ . 
I. 
2 
In its opinion of January 20, 1972 in Doe v. McMillan, a 
divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit ruled, on grounds of immunity, that 
a federal district court had no jurisdiction to en tertain the 
appellants' right to privacy claims against any of the classes of 
persons outlined above--all on the basis of "official immunity," 
and some on the additional basis of Constitutional immunity under 
Article 1, Section 6 (The Congressman, Committee Staff and 
Committee consultants). 
The decision to file a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
rather than to return to the Court of Appeals "tvith a Petition for 
Rehearing or a Suggestion for Hearing En Bane, is due primarily 
to the filing this week of cross petitions for "tvrits of certiorari 
in Gravel v. Do~ (Nos. 71-1331, 1332 and 1335; First Circuit, 
January 7, 1972; rehearing__ deni~d, January 18, 1972). The recent 
filing of these petitions, together "tvith the pendency of another 
case in the Supreme Court raising questions dealing with Article 1, 
Section 6, immunity (United States v. Bre"t·7Ster, No. 70-45, restored 
to the calender for reargument, 40 U.S.L.W. 3351), indicated to us 
that a sav~ng of the Supreme Court's time and effort would result 
. from concurrent consideration of the questions raised in Doe v. 
McMillan w·ith the questions presented in the other cases. 
Secondly, on J·anuary 10, 1972, the Supreme Court granted a 
petition for a "tvrit of certiorari filed by the District of Columbia 
Government in District_ of C_qJ~~bi_~ v. f_arter (No. "71-564) which 
·presents questions as to the scope of the "official immunity" doctrine 
in the District of Columbia. See Carter v. Carlson, u.s. App. 
D.C. ____ , 447 F. 2d 358 (1971). In Carter, a panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District --of-Ge-l-""..:i.m&i-a--G-ire-ui-t- li-mi-t::-ed---------
the doctrine of official immunity, distinguished ~~rr v. Matte~, 
360 U.s. 564. (1959), and announced that the test for differentiating 
ministerial from discretionary actions by governmental officia~and 
employees is a factual one and therefore cannot be determined from 
the pleadings alone (as was done in Doe v. McHillan). -- -----
-
Accordingly, we believe that the questions \vhich shall be 
presented in our petition \oJill provide the Supreme Court with 
issues which are central to its announced inquiries il1;tO Article 1, 
Section 6, immunity, and official immunity, in the context of the 
right of private citizens to protect their privacy. 
We have today filed a motion \,7i.th the United States Court of 
Appeals requesting a continuation of its . injunction pending 
certiorari proceedings , provided that a petition for a writ of 
certiorari is filed with the Supreme Court no l a t er than March 13, 
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v. McMillan for your consideration. 
If you have any questions, please contact myself or 
Mr. Michael Valder, an attorney on the staff of the Urban Law 
Institute of Antioch College who is actively engaged with me in 




cc: Hon. Irwin N. Gris\vold 
Solicitor General of 
the United States 
" / - / 
Sincerely yours, 
~~ . /1 >.--.J..M- {l;._,___ 
~&/~~.,lfi I . 
Jean Camper Cahn 
Director, 
Urban Law Institute of 
Antioch College, and 
Atto~~ey for Appellants 
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No. 71-10 7 and 71-1026 GRAVEL v. U.S. 
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1958) 
This case involves the extent of "executive privilege" under common 
law. 
The Acting Director of Rent stabilization issued a press release 
announcing suspension of certain employees, who were criticized therein. 
The employees instituted a libel action, and the defense of absolute privilege 
was invoked - and sustained in an opinion by Harlan (concurred in only by 
Frankfurter, Clark and Whittaker). Black concurred in the result; Warren, 
Douglas and Brennan dissented, holding that at most there is only a 
"qualified'executive official except at the highest level - such as a cabinet 
officer (as in Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483). 
If the privilege was absolute, no suit could be maintain. If merely 
"qualified", then liability can be imposed only if the statement is untrue 
and malice can be proved. 
Justice Harlan noted that "the law of privilege as a defense by officers 
of government to civil damage suits for defamation and kindred torts has in 
large part been of judicial making." He noted that judges have an absolute 
privilege with respect to their judicial functions. Mter citing Spaulding v. 
Vilas (which sustained an absolute privilege on behalf of the Postmaster 
General), Har Ian said: 
'We do not think that the principle announced in Vilas can 
properly be restricted to executive officers of cabinet rank 
... The privilege is not a badge or emolument of 
exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to 
aid in the effective functioning of government. " ( 572) 
Dissenting Opinions 
2. 
Chief Justice Warren, with Douglas joining, strongly dissented on 
the ground that executive privilege (with the possible exception of most 
senior officers was "qualified" only). He would not "extend Vilas to cover 
public statements of lesser officials". 
The dissenters emphasized the importance of public criticism and 
debate, saying: 
"-----'" "Thus, at best, a public critic of government has a qualified 
privilege. " ( 585) 
(Note: If this language is applied to the aids of Senator Gravel, their common 
law privilege would be only a qualified one.) 
Justice Brennan dissent followed the same line. stewart dissented 
purely on the facts, agreeing generally with the principles stated by Justice 
Harlan. 
lfp/ss lee 5/4/72 
No. 71-1017 and 71-1026 Gravel v. U.S. 
Analysis of Opinion of First Circuit (Judge Bailey Aldrich) 
The Factual Setting 
A Grand Jury sought to investigate facts relating to the obtaining 
and publication of the Pentagon papers by Senator Gravel. 
Gravel himself was not summonsed, and the government states that 
it has no intention of calling him. But his aide, Dr. Rodberg, and Howard 
Webber (director of MIT press) were summonsed. They moved to limit 
the testimony that can be presented to the grand jury, and Gravel intervened 
to assert the Speech or Debate Clause (the Clause) which reads in part as 
follows: 
" .. for any speech or debate in either House (they) Senators 
and Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. " 
Decision of District Court (Judge Garrity) 
See petition for writ, p. 38, for Judge Garrity's :e:x:KHiBd. excellent 
opinion. 
The protective order entered by Judge Garrity was modified by 
the Court of Appeals to read as follows: 
(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating 
the release of the Pentagon Papers may be questioned about 
Senator Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee 
on Pulbic Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor, if 
the questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind 
the Senator's conduct at that meeting, about any communica-
tions with him or with his aides regarding the activities of the 
Senator or his aides during the period of their employment, 
in preparation for and related to said meeting. 
(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned 
about his own actions "in the broadest sense, including 
observations and communications, oral or written, by or 
to him, or coming to his attention" while being interviewed 
for, or after having been engaged as a member of Senator 
Gravel's personal staff to the extent that they were in the 
course of his employment. 
The Opinion of the First Circuit 
(a) Area admittedly covered by Clause. Whatever a senator says 
or does on the floor, or before a subcommittee, is within the absolute 
2. 
privilege. This also extends to written reports of Committees. As to these 
matters - which in the words of the Court's opinion in Johnson are within 
the "legislative process" - a Senator need not answer questions anywhere -
before a grand jury or otherwise. 
(b) Source of material and information The circuit court opinion 
extends the privilege to the "acquisition of information", holding that a 
Senator cannot be asked where he obtained l§lm papers or information. The 
opinion draws a distinction between the privilege in this respect, and the 
possibility of criminal prosecution - based on other evidence - if the 
Senator has violated the law in obtaining the information. 
(My Comm~nt: I am not sure this is a correct view. We might draw a line, 
as in the Brewster case, between questions about a criminal act and 
3. 
questions as to the use of the fruits of the Act in a speech or otherwise in 
the legislative process. For example, if there was reason to believe that 
a Senator had~ burglarized an office and stolen top secret papers, 
I think he could be asked whether he committed this crime. He could not 
be asked what he did with the stolen documents, whether he used them in a 
speech or otherwise in the legislative process. Admittedly this is a difficult 
line to draw; yet, I am not persuaded that the Clause was intended to prevent 
questioning a Senator - before a grand jury or otherwise - about a burglary, 
the taking of a bribe or any other specific crime.) 
(c) Private publication (republication). The opinion notes that Gravel 
does not claim his freedom to speak is circumscribed by any inquiry into 
the subsequent private publication: 
"Intervenor (Gravel) acknowledges that it will not affect his 
freedom to speak (if the right to public privately is denied), 
since the speech has already been made (and can be 
repeated in the Senate) but argues that republication is 
essential to the 'due functioning of the legislative proces8 '" 
(A 25). 
In denying Gravel's argument, the Court went on to say: 
"The difficulty is that the term 'legislative process' is no 
more self-defining than 'Speech or Debate.' The language 
and history of the Speech or Debate clause is a surer 
guide to the scope of the privilege than catch-phrases, and 
we find in both a focus upon matters occurring in the course 
of deliberation. This had been the English concept upon which 
our privilege had been ~patterned. 
* * * * * 
"Our courts have expanded the privilege beyond the act 
of debating within Congress a proposal before it only when 
necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such 
deliberations. See Kilbourne v. Thompson, ante; Coffin 
v. Coffin, 1808, 4 Tyng (Mass. ). 1. --
'We do not find private republication within that 
category. The fact that it may be customarily done by 
members of Congress is not the answer. Only those 
acts by which a congressman ordinarily expresses to the 
House his views on matters before it come within the 
Supreme Court's extension of the privilege to 'things 
generally done * * * in relation to the st business before 
4. 
Congress L ' Kilbourne v. Thompson, ante, at 204. 
A, 25, 26, 27) 
( My Comment: I cannot accept Gravel's argument that the clause covers 
"informing the electorate". If so, any speech made anywhere by a Senator 
would be protected; any communication - such as the weekly newsletter -
would be so protected. It seems clear to me that this type of speech and 
conduct is not within either the language or the intent - as derived from its 
history of the Clause.) 
(d) Common law privilege. Citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 
(absolute immunity given to a subordinate officer in the executive d~partment 
as to a news release), the Circuit Court - by a tortuous process of HHE 
nebulous reasoning (A p. 28) concludes that although there is no privilege 
under the speech or debate clause with respect to private publication, 
Senator Gravel has a common law privilege and therefore "he may not be 
questioned at all as to republication". 
5. 
(My Comment: This makes no sense to me whatever. If a Senator has a 
"absolute privilege" as to all private publications merely by virtue of 
being a Senator, we have really opened "a can of worms"! 
(e) Legislative aides. The First Circuit concludes that "the aide 
and the legislature ' (are to be) treated as one", and that this "synonymity 
is founded upon the relationship, and not upon the fact of employment. The 
court also holds: 
"Rodberg, for example, is not protected from inquiry as 
to event unconnected, with intervenor at the time of 
occurence. We reject intervenor's contention that the 
fact of hiring insulated him from all inquiry as to prior 
events related to the Papers, but not to intervenor. " 
(A 29) 
(My comment: I agree with the First Circuit as to the status of aides). 
(f) Third parties. The Court said: 
"We hold that no immunity was conferred upon Beacon press 
simply because, if he did Gravel delivered the papers to it 
for private publication. " 
Protective Order 
It seems to me that the Court's protective order (set forth above) 
goes beyond its opinion and effectively gives Gravel just about everything 
he asked for except with respect to Beacon Press. 
The first paragraph of the protective order relates to Gravel's 
conduct, and says that no witness may be questioned as to Gravel's 
6. 
conduct at the subcommittee meeting nor may any witness be questioned 
"if the questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind the Senator's 
conduct at that meeting, about any communication with him or his aides 
regarding the activities of the Senator or his aides during the period of their 
employment, in preparation for and related to said meeting. " 
(My Comment: I do not disagree with the substance of this part of the 
protective order. The difficulty relatesto the phrase "motives or purposes", 
which are very difficult to define precisely. My tentative view is that I 
would accept this paragraph, unless more specific language can be suggested. 
The effect would be that each question would really have to be judged according 
to how it is framed. ) 
The second paragraph of the protective order is troublesome. It 
states that Rodberg may not be questioned about his acts, observations, 
speak or communications while being interviewed for, and after being 
employed as, an aide to Gravel provided only that his actions,observations 
and speech "were in the course of his employment". 
(My Comment: This seems to give Rodberg an even broader privilege than 
Senator Gravel would have. The "course of his employment" is not limited 
in any way to legislative activities or to the legislative process. Unless 
I misread the order, if Gravel had sent Rodberg off to burglarize the Riggs 
Bank to raise money for Gravel's campaign for reelection, this woul d be 
7. 
protected as it would surely be within the course of his employment. 
* * * * * 
My Tentative Position: 
:tik Although I will await the Conference hoping that the discussion 
will help clarify my views, I presently come down: (i) thinking that the 
ID.rst Circuit opinion is a good analysis of the problem generally and 
specifically, except where it goes off the deep end as to a common law legis-
lative privilege - which extends both to Gravel and his aides; and (ii) although 
the first paragraph of the protective order - nebulous as some of the language 
may be - seems reasonable and consistent with the opinion, I find the second 
paragraph at variance both with the opinion and with rationality. 
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You have prepared a very careful opinion 
for these cases, and I am glad to join. 
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Mr. Justice White 
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No. 71-1026)- U. S. v. Gravel 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice White 
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\ Re: No. 71-1017) - Gravel v. u. S. 
\ No. 71-1026) - u. s. v. Gravel 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
June 8, 1972 
6/12/72 
MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL 
Re: No. 71-1017 & 71-1026, Gravel v. U. s. 
Justice White's opinion in this case is pretty much along 
the lines )fA which we both, I think, agreed the Court should 
take~t says that the Senator has a privilege to prevent 
the Executive from inquiring into matters protected by the 
Clause even if the inquiry is made through aids, as opposed 
to the Senator 
not protected, 
himselB It also says that republication is 
a~it rejects the vague common law privilege 
which CA 1 hinted at in its opinion. There is only one aspect ........ _____ _ 
of the case with which I would quibble, but I think it is 
nevertheless important. In part IV of the opinion, beginning ... 
on page 20, Justice White states, "The grand jury, therefore, 
if relevant to its investigation into the possible violations 
of the criminal law and iNX§l!XXN!lfX~ absent Fifth AmllfN!S.]U!lfND!lfNXX 
Amendment objections,may require from Rodberg answers to 
questions relating to his or the Senator's arrangements, if -
any, with respect to rJublication or with respect to third 
__......__ ..... .._...,...._,.. " - ---
party conduct under valid investigation by the grand jury, as --long as the questions do not implicate legislative action of - ---- ---
the Senator." With that statement, I am in complete agreement, 
- -
but the next sentence reveals that Justice White's interpretation 
of "legislative action" is more narrow than I think proper. 
I also think it is more narrow than the way you were thinking 
before Conference when we talked, although admittedly we both 
found it. somewhat difficult to focus on the rather nebulous 




The sentence to which I object reads: 
"Neither do we perceive any constitutional or other privilege 
that sheilds Rodberg, any more than any other witness, 
from grand jury questions relevant to tracing the source 
of obviously highly classified documents that came into 
the Senator's possession and are the basic subj~ m?tter 
of 1-r:cw}ry in th~s caseJ•tu~ .~ o--a....,...,. ~~ _.,t...<) 
~-f_'l"'tp. ~~-:· . - ([ . . . 
same not~on ~s reflected ~n the Court's f~nal ~nstruct~ons 
to CA 1 in which Justice White says: 
CA 1's order forbids questioning any witness, including 
Rodberg "(4) except as proves relevant to investigating 
possible third party crime, concerning any act, in itself 
not criminal, performed by the Senator, or by his aids 
in the course of their employment, in preparation for 
the subcommittee hearing." 
From all this I gather that Justice White feels that the Speech 
or Debate Clause xNxk:bhrx permits the Executive to inquire 
into how and where a Senator or Representative gathered information 
which he used in making a speech or otherwise engaging in a 
legislative fuhction protected by the Clause. In short, he 
is saying that entering a document into the record of a committee 
( !:.:' "legislative action" and therefore protected, but acquiring 
that document is not protected. With this I cannot agree. -----It seems to me first that United States v. Johnson , 
383 U.S. 169 (1966) specifically condemned quite similar 
inquiries. In Johnson the government prosecuted a Congressman 
for conspiracy to defraud. As a part of this conspiracy 
Johnson gave a speech on the House floor defending Savings 
& Loan institutions. The inquiry which the Court found to 
be in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause focused on 
this speech, the reasons why it was given, and on how it was 
prepared and where the information came from. The Court said 
"The language of the Soeech or Deba~e Clause clearlv 
proscr~Des at Least some of tne ev~aence taKen auring 
-3-
trial. Extensive questioning went on concerning how much 
of the speech was written by Johnson himself, how much 
by his administrative · assistant, and how much by outs,iders 
representing the~ company. The 'government attorn~ 
asked Johnson specifical l y about certain sentences in the 
speech, the reasons for their inclusion and his personal 
knowled ge of the factual material supporting those statements. 
In closing argument the theory of the prosecution was very 
clearly dependen't on the wording of the speech. I n addition 
to questioning the manner of preparation and the precise 
ingredients of the speech, the Government inquired into 
the motives for g iving it." 
Accompanying this paragraph in the text, on pages 173-76, 
are lengthy footnoes quoting the questions and statements made 
by the government which the Cpurt found to be prohibited by 
the Clause. It is clear from reading xbnrx those footnotes 
that the Court objected to inquiry into where Johnson obtained 
the information that went into the speech. Yet Justice White's 
'nion specifically permits the same kind of inquiry in this 
It seems to me that such XHXNXMXXXNRXXNNNXNXE~x inquiries 
should be prohibited by the Clause because the gathering of 
information and materials for use in the leg islative process 
is a leg islative function~. To a certain extent the entire 
committee phase of the leg islative process, to which Justice 
White says the privilege applies, is an information- gathering 
phas;t· Surely, for example, if Senator Gravel had received 
the Pentagon Papers from his source as a part of the committee 
hearing , the Executive could make no inquiry of Sen Gravel 
about xkKx~x~~XXXNX his acquisitiono As a practical matter, 
however, not all information that serves as the basis of a 
speech (I assume that entering a document into the record is 
the functional equivalent of having included the document in 




source of information essential to the/leg islative function 
of keeping tabs on Executive actions is information leaked 
by dis gruntled employees. If, however, the executive can 
~
compell a Member or his aids to indicate where the information 
came from, it will undoubtedly dry up this source of information 
to some extent. That might have some good effects for the 
information obtained in this way is no doubt often of dubious 
character, as in , for instances, the Optepka episodeo On 
the other hand, Sen. Williams of Delaware used to make good 
use of such information in challenging what he believed to be 
wasteful prog~ams. The point is that if the privlege does 
not protect the gathering of information used on the leg islative 
process, the ability of Members to obtain certain information 
will be impaired. 
This is not to say that any activity involved in the 
information gathering phase should be protected. If a Member 
is caught breaking and entering in order to obtain information, 
it should not matter what his purpose was in engag ing in such 
illegal conduct. More to the point, if the person from whom 
Gravel ultimately received the papers enga ged in illegal 
activity, he shoul d be tried. But the Executive should not 
be able to use the Senator or his aids as a conduit to the 
ultimate source of the papers by merely saying that there is 
• 
a possible third party crime. To a certain extent, this is 
\ 
what I thought the Court was saying in Brewster,Tllegal conduct 
is punishable even if committed by a Senator and even if 
related to the leg islative process, but the Executive in 
-5-
prosecuting such conduct may not inquire of activity that is 
part of the due functioning of the leg islative process. I 
think that obtaining information to be used in the process 
is part of its due functioning , and I do not think the Executive 
should be permitted to inquire into how that information was 
obtained. 
I n sum, I think JohnsoQ as well as the theory of the 
Speech or Debate Clause being spun in Brewster prohibits asking 
a Senator or his aids about where or how they got information 
later used in the leg islative process. It is perfectly permissible 
to punish anyone for illegal conduct even if it should be 
shown that the conduct was connected with the gatherimg of 
information to be used in the process, but you may not say to 
a Senator where and how did you get the information on which 
you based that speech. 
I suggest that you see if Justice White might be willing 
to alter the two sentences in the last part of his opinion. 
Fox 
6/15/72 
MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL 
w~ ~a~. 
~~ --Re: 71-1017 and 71-1026, Gravel v. U. s. 
When we talked, I did not focus on your two suggested 
changes in Justice White's opinion. I agree with you that 
I '\ some sort of ~robable cause requirement along the lines you 
suggest is needed. I wonder, however, if that alone is enou gh 
.... '7 
to permit a Member of Congress or his aid to be called before 
a grand jury and asked about sources for data used in leg islative 
proceedings. For one thing , probable cause is not all that 
strong a standard. Yet if a Member or his aid is called before 
a grand jury, the impact on his political career would be 
quite serious. In the public mind, being summoned before a 
grand jury is something that happens to the Mafia or Communists 
or other disreputable types. If the Executive Branch wishes 
to punish a Senator for some act which it illexxRxe dislikes for 
political reasons and if it can somehow link the Senator with 
a criminal investigation, it could summon him or an aid before 
the grand jury thereby doing considerable damage to the Senator's 
political reputation. I do not suggest that this is what 
happened here, but it could well be that a Senator might receive 
information from a confidential source on which he might base 
a speech not knowing that there had been any impropriety in 
the source's acquisition of the information. Calling him before 
a grand jury might injure the Senator severely for an act 
which was altogether innocent except that it annoyed the 
Executive Branch. 
I do not mean to imply that in no case should a Senator or 
-2-
his aids be called before a grand jury to be asked about 
sources, but I think a greater showing than probable cause 
that a crime has been committed should be made. I do not 
have a standard completely doped out, but I should think that 
probable cause plus some showing that the testimony of the 
Senator or his aid was necessary to the investigation. In 
that way you could insure that genuine criminal acts wNi~N 
of which a Senator was an essential witness could not go 
uninvestigated but you would prevent the Executive from calling 
a Senator or his aid when their testimony was not essential 
and when the purpose of making them witnesses is to embarass 
them politically. It seems to me that such a result would 
protect both the Executive's interest in searching out and 
prosecuting crime and the legislator's interest in independence 
which is reflected in the Speech or Deba.et clause. 
Incidentally in your second rider, the one that beg ins 
with (4 ) , I think there is a missing negative. Shouldn't 
the words in brackets read "no questions may be asked"? 
Fox 
June 18, 1972 
Re: No. 71-1017 and No. 71-1026 Gravel 
v. u.s. 
Dear Byron: 
There is one point in the opinioo. which possibly you may want 
to take a second look at. It relates to the '1hird party" crime problem 
and whether there is any real danger of a member of Congress (or 
his aide) being harused as to his sources an the pretect that such a 
crime had been committed. 
I enclose a draft rider for your subparagraph 4, page 21, 
which you might consider. It suggests that there must be probable 
cause to believe a third party crime has been committed before a 
member of the Congress or his aide may be interrogated. 
It might also be desirable to require a showing that the 
testimony is reasonably necessary to a proper investigation of the 
crime. 
I am fully in accord with your basic proposition that the privilege 
should 1M prevent a bona fide investigation of a third party crime, 
provided no legislative act is implicated. 
If you can include a clarification along these lines, I think it 
might be helpful. Your opinion, an a difficult and delicate subject, 
is an excellent one and 1 am happy to join you - as I am doing in a 
separate note to the Conference. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
be: Phil 
-
Rider, p. 21 
( 4) except where there is probable cause to believe a third party 
crime has been committed, [no questions may be asked] concerning 
any act, in itself not criminal, performed by the Senator or by his 
aides in the course of their employment in preparation for the sub-
committee hearing. 
June 18, 1972 
Re: No. 71-1017 and No. 71-1026 - Gravel 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 

